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ABSTRACT
This report provides an analysis of the fiscal impact of 
migration in the European Union in the past and the 
future. It highlights that currently natives generally show 
a higher net fiscal contribution than extra-EU migrants 
and a similar contribution to intra-EU migrants. However, 
due to ageing of the native population, this relationship is 
bound to reverse in the near future. The report calculates 
that by 2035 an average extra-EU migrant would be a net 
beneficiary of public transfers, but to a lesser extent than 
the average native would, while intra-EU mobile citizens 
would continue being net contributors.    
The report also analyses six possible policy scenarios and 
their implications for the fiscal contributions of extra-
EU migrants. These simulations highlight how acting on 
the size of the flows of new migrants without removing 
the obstacles to their full labour market integration 
would yield small fiscal benefits for the hosting country. 
Labour market policies targeted at increasing labour 
participation of migrants could generate large fiscal gains. 
To evaluate the static net fiscal impact of migration based 
on micro-data the analysis uses EUROMOD, a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model for the European Union enriched 
with data on in-kind benefits. This is based on OECD data 
for apportioning the cost of education social housing and 
health care provision. For projecting the long-run fiscal 
effect of migration, the simulations use CEPAM-Mic, a 
dynamic microsimulation projection model.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the last few decades the economies of many EU 
Member States have faced slowing growth rates, increasing 
inequality and ageing populations. An ageing population, 
in particular, raises concerns for the sustainability of 
many European welfare systems that were designed in 
a historical period under different demographic dynamics. 
The current demographic transformation towards an older 
population imposes the burden of providing the fiscal 
resources needed to sustain European standards of social 
protection on a smaller body of active workers. Among 
the frequently envisaged solutions, some believe that 
European countries must consider cutting their extensive 
social protection scheme and activate all segments of 
the potentially active populations in trying to reverse the 
adverse demographic trend. To this end, migration can be 
considered an important element of a complex policy mix. 
In fact, as migrants generally move at the beginning of 
their working life, they can partially compensate for the 
demographic deficit, expand the tax base and contribute 
to economic growth. Yet immigration also raise challenges. 
For instance, the net fiscal effect of immigration could be 
negative if immigrants have inconsistent career paths 
and low earnings but at the same time benefit from large 
social benefit payments. 
 
To date, few comprehensive, EU-wide analysis on the net 
fiscal impact of immigration have provided an answer 
to how immigration impacts on the resources needed 
for social welfare systems. Most importantly, no analysis 
has specifically addressed this question in dynamic terms 
considering how the impact is likely to evolve in the 
coming decades. This report aims at filling this gap by 
analysing the present and future net fiscal impact of 
immigration in the EU through a combination of fiscal 
and demographic models. In particular, we aim to answer 
the following questions: Can an inflow of foreign young 
immigrants compensate for the dwindling active native 
population? Can this inflow balance the negative effect of 
ageing on the public purse by expanding the tax base on 
which European welfare systems are based? Should EU 
countries attract more immigrants and/or should they offer 
better labour market opportunities to migrants to render 
EU welfare system sustainable in the future?
 
The report accounts for current tax and benefit structures 
in different EU Member States to give a snapshot 
of the current net fiscal position for natives, intra-
EU and extra-EU migrants and it projects how these 
contributions and benefits could evolve in the next 20 
years based on six immigration scenarios. The scenarios 
illustrate the consequences of changes in the overall 
size of immigration, integration, selective immigration, 
labour force participation and employment. Rather than 
representing plausible futures these scenarios should be 
read as what if projections on immigration to explore the 
net fiscal effects also under extreme assumptions.
 
The findings in the report show that there are large 
differences in net fiscal contributions over the life 
cycle for all categories considered i.e. natives, intra-EU 
immigrants and extra-EU immigrants. Overall, net fiscal 
contributions are negative until about age 30, positive 
and increasing during working life and until retirement 
and negative and decreasing afterwards. Comparing the 
fiscal contributions of the three groups reveals that, for 
the majority of their working lives, natives contribute more 
than extra-EU immigrants. The higher net contribution of 
natives is a consequence of their higher average income, 
which in turn is related to higher wages, labour market 
participation and lower unemployment. The differences 
between Member States depend on their fiscal and socio-
economic policies and on their past success in attracting 
high-skilled immigrants and integrating them in the labour 
market.
 
When decomposing the structure of social 
expenditures and tax schemes, we find that pensions 
and other old-age related benefits account for a very 
high share of social expenditures while the majority of 
contributions are paid as social security contributions and 
taxes on income. By comparing the per-capita contributions 
and benefits of natives and immigrants, we have three 
key findings: natives contribute more than immigrants in 
personal income taxes, they receive higher pensions, and 
social transfers targeted to them (e.g. family benefits, 
health benefits, housing benefits and social assistance 
benefits) are lower. The first and second findings relate 
to the higher labour earnings and past social security 
contributions of natives compared to immigrants. The 
third finding is explained by differences in socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics and in particular, by 
differences in family structures between natives and 
immigrants.
 
In terms of future evolution of the current scenario, 
assuming that fiscal policies will remain unchanged for the 
next two decades, the report calculates that by 2035 both 
natives and, to a smaller extent, extra-EU immigrants will 
be net beneficiaries of public transfers. On the contrary, 
intra-EU migrants will remain net contributors thanks to 
their favourable age and education composition.
The simulations of different immigration scenarios 
highlight how acting on the size of the flows of new 
migrants without removing the obstacles to their full 
labour market integration will yield small fiscal benefits 
for the hosting country. 
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Labour market policies targeted at increasing the 
participation of immigrants in the labour market, 
instead, could generate higher fiscal gains. Compared 
to fiscal contributions under the current scenario, if 
immigrants were to have the same labour intensity of 
natives – defined as participation in the labour market 
-  their per capita net fiscal contributions in 2035 would 
increase by more than 1,000 euros. Combining both 
favourable assumptions, in a scenario of perfect integration 
would generate up to 3,500 euros in per-capita gains 
for the average extra-EU immigrant. Although the fiscal 
benefits of policies favouring the integration of immigrants 
in hosting labour markets are evident, the report estimates 
that no immigration and integration scenario can entirely 
offset the heavy burden that an ageing population imposes 
on the public finances of many Member States. The perfect 
integration scenario predicts that in 2035 the per-capita 
per year fiscal contributions of the average European 
resident would be 569 euros higher than in the current 
scenario. Nonetheless, the expected fiscal contribution of 
the typical EU resident would remain negative.
2 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf
The report findings stress that policies aimed at 
promoting the full integration of immigrants into 
the labour markets of their host countries can 
generate considerable fiscal gains for all Member 
States. But they also suggest that immigration alone 
will not be sufficient for ensuring the sustainability 
of European welfare states for two main reasons. 
First, although most immigrants arrive while still young 
and productive, they will eventually age becoming more 
reliant on public transfers. Second, migrants represent 
only a minor fraction of the total population residing in 
the Union and will continue to be a minority under any 
plausible migration scenario. Although an integrated 
migrant workforce can contribute its fair share to 
the Member States public purses, the real challenges 
to the European welfare states sustainability are 
posed by the steadily ageing European population. 
UNDERSTANDING THE 
EVIDENCE
To evaluate the static net fiscal impact of migration 
based on micro-data, we use EUROMOD, the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model for the European Union. EUROMOD 
is a unique tool for international comparative research 
on the effects of taxes and benefits, using individual 
and household data from the European Union Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). For this project, we 
complemented the EUROMOD output with information on 
value added taxes (VAT) by simulating VAT rules using the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) to take into account the 
different consumption patterns of migrants and natives. 
We extend EUROMOD to include restrictions imposed 
by tax-benefit policies based on residence length or the 
citizenship status. Finally, we supplement the EUROMOD 
output with imputed information on in-kind benefits related 
to education, health care provision and social housing, 
based on the OECD data and observed education status 
and age.
 
For projecting the long-run fiscal effect of migration, we 
use CEPAM-Mic a dynamic microsimulation projection 
model. CEPAM-Mic microsimulation model operates at 
the individual level. It projects the occurrence and timing of 
demographic and socio-economic events that shape future 
characteristics of individuals and their future offspring 
based on a series of interrelated prediction models. The 
base population is created from the EU-Labour Force 
Survey (EU-LFS) microdata files and supplemented by 
other surveys such as the European Social Survey to impute 
those individual characteristics not available in the EU-LFS.
 
In this report, we adopt the country of birth criteria for 
defining immigrant following the United Nation definition 
(IOM, 2019).2 Accordingly, an immigrant is a person who 
has moved across a boundary regardless of that person 
legal status. This implies that, in our definition, some 
European citizens are defined as immigrants if they 
were born outside of the Union. Among immigrants, we 
distinguish two groups: intra-EU immigrants, defined as 
anyone born in one of the 27 EU Member States plus the 
United Kingdom, but residing in a Member State other 
than the country of birth; and extra-EU immigrants as 
anyone born outside of the Union and currently residing in 
one of its members. As the model was developed before 
the United Kingdom left the European Union, U.K. citizens 
residing in one of the remaining 27 Members are still 
1
1
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classified as intra-EU migrants, even though the report 
does not produce specific figures for the U.K.  
Our estimates and simulations are liable to bias. They 
rely on a number of assumptions, and therefore should 
be interpreted with care. Most of the possible source of 
bias and assumptions are detailed in the main body of the 
report. For reasons that are made clear in the report, cross-
country comparisons should be exercised with caution. 
 
The report focuses on the fiscal benefits of immigration for 
the receiving countries only. Some Eastern and Southern 
Member States are experiencing a considerable outflow 
towards Western and Northern Member States. The 
consequences of emigration for the sending countries 
are potentially substantial, but are not considered in this 
report.
Lastly, we want to clarify that our projections are based 
on data predating the large inflow of asylum seekers 
into the Union fleeing the civil war in Syria in 2015 and 
the economic shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Especially the second of these two shocks is likely to have 
deep and lasting repercussions both for the inflow of new 
immigrants in the Union and their chances of integration. 
It will be critical to re-examine if and how our conclusions 
will be modified by the two events once the right data 
become available
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU12
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1. INTRODUCTION
2 See database migr_pop5ctz taken from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, last accessed 13/07/2019.
3 According to the OECD, on average, EU MSs spent 23% of their GDP to fund their social security programmes in 2018. The average for
the other non EU OECD members was 18%. Source: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG, last accessed 07/11/2019.
According to the most recent figures by Eurostat for 20192 
there are almost 40 million people born outside of the 
European Union (EU) residing in one of its 27 Member 
States (MS) plus the United Kingdom and almost 22 million 
EU citizens living in a different Member State from the 
one of birth. This is up from 33.4 million and 18 million, 
respectively, in 2014 – the first available year for this series 
- corresponding to a 21% and 22% increase in five years.
 
While irregular arrivals to the EU have reduced to pre-
crisis level, the number of immigrants legally living within 
the Union is growing and for many Member States this 
is a new phenomenon that generates a range of social, 
political and economic considerations. One of the main 
considerations for policy makers and public opinions alike 
is whether immigrants contribute their fair share to their 
host country tax and welfare system. Fears of welfare 
abuses are common among European citizens (Boeri, 2010) 
as well as worries that the generous European welfare 
systems might act as a magnet for welfare-dependent 
migrants (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009). Concerns about 
fiscal fairness surpass those about labour market effects 
of immigration in public opinion’s assessment and are hard 
to ignore for governments (Dustmann and Preston, 2007).
 
Apart from public attitudes on migration and questions of 
perceived fairness, the fiscal implications of immigration 
are especially salient for the EU Member States considering 
how extensive and comparably expensive their social 
protection systems are.3
 
Migration can have both positive and negative 
consequences for the economies and public budgets in 
the receiving countries. Focusing on the fiscal aspect only, 
a growing immigrant population can help alleviate the 
financial burden that an ageing population imposes on 
pension systems. Immigrants often move during their most 
productive years while they are still active and before 
they require frequent and costly medical care or before 
maturing the rights to pension transfers. At the same 
time, migrants generate a number of expenses specifically 
targeted at their cultural and economic integration and 
they tend to earn lower wages and fall into unemployment 
more frequently than natives (Conte and Mazza, 2019). 
In general, the age structure of the immigrant population 
is expected to contribute to a positive net fiscal effect, as 
they are overrepresented in age groups where contributions 
exceed benefits. Conversely, based on the current record 
of their integration in the European labour markets, we 
can expect their labour market performance, which tends 
to be lower than that of natives, to weight negatively on 
their net fiscal contribution. 
 
Understanding how these differences affects public budgets 
becomes central as the migrant population in the EU keeps 
growing. 
 
A second reason why the fiscal impact of immigration has 
gained the attention of policy makers in recent years is 
the observation that an ageing population threatens the 
sustainability of the most generous European welfare 
states. The inflow of a young and active population seems 
to offer an at least partial solution to this issue. 
 
In this report, we tackle these central questions by 
calculating the net fiscal contribution of natives, intra-EU 
and extra-EU migrants for the 27 Member States based 
on the EUROMOD micro simulation model. The model is 
able to simulate individual and household tax liabilities and 
benefit entitlements following the policy rules in place in 
each EU Member State starting from individual microdata. 
These simulations are also the basis for the dynamic 
simulation provided in the following sections of the report. 
The simulations allow us to gain some understanding of 
how demographic dynamics – especially ageing – would 
potentially interact with labour market dynamics and fiscal 
policies.    
 
The methodological questions raised by the calculation of 
the fiscal impacts of immigration are complex. The two 
general approaches that have been taken in the literature 
is to either compare current tax/benefit balances or adopt 
a forward-looking approach and project the evolution of 
migrants’ contributions over their life-cycles. No approach is 
free of limitations though. Concentrating on the current tax/
benefit balance has the advantage of precisely quantifying 
the status quo without recurring to arbitrary assumptions, 
but it cannot offer any indication on how the balance will 
evolve in the future. The static approach also provides a 
cross-sectional view that might reflect more the differences 
in age structure of the native and immigrant populations 
rather than the intrinsic effects of the contributions and 
benefits of each population category. In the context of 
fiscal balances where current commitments have long 
lasting consequences for governments´ coffers, a static 
accounting could limit the policy indications that one 
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU14
BOX 1 Definitions of group of origin
• Native: a person born in the current EU Member State of residence;
• Intra-EU migrant: a person born in a Member State (EU28) other than the EU Member State of residence;
• Extra-EU migrant: a person born outside of the European Union (EU28).
 
A person can be defined as an immigrant either because the country of birth differs from the current country of 
residence (birth criteria) or because the citizenship differs (citizenship criteria). In this study, we follow the country 
of birth criteria. We believe this to be the most appropriate criteria in the context of this report where we present 
cross-country estimations as procedures and requirements for obtaining citizenships vary between Member States. 
From this definition, it follows that we classify some citizens of the Member States as immigrants. These people are 
more likely to be well integrated in their country; therefore, our classification might enhance the net contribution of 
immigrants compared to studies adopting the citizenship criteria.
can derive from it. On the other hand, dynamic, forward-
looking approaches have the advantage of projecting 
how current policies could affect long-term fiscal budget 
sustainability. Such foresight exercise comes at a cost 
though. Future projections are only possible when 
imposing stringent assumptions on demographic and 
social evolutions, technological innovations and human 
behaviours, phenomena that are often unpredictable by 
nature. It is, however, possible and quite common to use 
scenarios to compare different possible futures that would 
result from a plausible continuation of recent trends or 
policy-induced changes.
 
Researchers in these areas are then confronted with a clear 
trade-off and it is probably safe to say that no approach 
can claim undisputed superiority over the other. Yet, most 
of the available research has focused on the quantification 
of current tax/benefit balance (Chojnicki et al., 2018; OECD, 
2013). To the best of our knowledge, this Report represents 
the first attempt to provide an EU-wide projection of the 
net fiscal contributions of natives and immigrants.4
 
We find that typically residents in the EU are net contributors 
during their working life and net beneficiaries in retirement. 
The overall net current fiscal contribution over the life 
course is positive for all three groups if we consider the 
cross-country average.5 Intra-EU immigrants are the 
largest net contributors, while extra-EU are the smallest. 
When we project the average fiscal contribution of each of 
the three groups for the next two decades several results 
emerge. First, if unchanged, the demographic evolution 
4 In this report, we adopt the birth criteria to define a migrant. We use the term migrant only when referring to both intra and extra EU 
migrants.
5 This report calculates the net fiscal contribution as the difference between contributions payed and benefits received. A net contributor is 
someone whose contributions exceed benefits and net beneficiary if benefits exceed contributions.
of the native population, in particular their ageing, would 
render the average native a net beneficiary of state 
transfers. Second, intra-EU migrants are the only group 
projected to be net contributors on average. Third, if the 
current labour market integration of extra-EU migrants is 
not improving, their net fiscal contribution would become 
negative as well. Fourth, policies aimed at promoting the 
labour market integration of migrants could pay substantial 
fiscal dividends for the hosting country. Fifth, even in 
the most favourable scenarios of an extra-EU migrant 
population highly integrated and selected, by 2035, the 
average EU resident would be a net beneficiary of state 
transfers, mostly due to the negative influence of the 
predominant native population. 
 
We believe that the evidence presented here which 
supplements the indications emerging from static 
accounting exercises, will help providing a more complete 
picture of the implications of immigration for the European 
welfare states.
 
The report unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss 
the recent trends and characteristics of immigration 
phenomenon in Europe. Section 3 and 4 present the 
microsimulations models used to evaluate the static and 
dynamic fiscal impact of immigration. Section 5 reports 
and explains the population-based projections. Section 6 
concludes by summarising the main findings and discussing 
the main limitations of the data and microsimulations 
models involved in this research.
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2. IMMIGRATION IN 
EUROPE: RECENT 
TRENDS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS
6 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_pop3ctb&lang=en
7 For each country in Figure 1, the first bar corresponds to the year 2015 and the second to the year 2019
In recent years, most European countries have seen an 
increase in foreign-born individuals as a share of the 
total population. In 2019, Eurostat recorded 40 million 
people born outside the EU and residing in one of the 
27 Member States (MSs) plus the UK, and 22.4 million 
people born in a MS other than their country of residence.6 
The aggregate data hides a considerable heterogeneity 
between MS. Luxembourg is the country with the highest 
share of population born elsewhere, as it hosts an 
exceptionally high number of foreign-born population, 
corresponding to a share of 47% of the total population. 
In this ranking, Luxembourg is followed by Cyprus, with 
21% of the resident population born abroad, and Malta 
and Austria whose share of foreign-born population were 
20% and 19.2% respectively (Figure 1).7 We observe 
the lowest shares of foreign population in Central and 
FIGURE 1. FOREIGN BORN POPULATION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, 2015 - 2019 
SOURCE: OUR ELABORATION BASED ON EUROSTAT DATA (ONLINE DATA CODE: MIGR_POP3CTB)
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Eastern European countries: in Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
and Romania the share of the total foreign-born population 
is below 4%. Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hungary, and 
Slovakia are the only MSs with the number of individuals 
born in other MS exceeding the number of non-EU born.
 
The activity rate of the EU working age population varies 
according to the country of birth. In 2019, the highest 
activity rate was among people born in another EU 
country (80%), while for people born outside the EU it 
was 71.5%, and for natives 74%. The largest differences 
between the activity rates of the native and extra-EU 
population were recorded in the Netherlands, where the 
native population had an activity rate 14.8 percentage 
points higher than the equivalent non-EU born population 
rate, followed by Denmark (13 points). Compared to the 
population born in another MS, Latvia and Lithuania show 
the most pronounced differences with activity rates for 
natives that are 10.8 and 4.9 points higher. In 2019, the 
employment rate in the EU-28 for the native working age 
population was 69.6%, slightly above the 67% observed 
among the foreign-born population. However, if the latter 
figure is disaggregated by place of birth, the employment 
rate for people born in another MS was 74.6%, while the 
employment rate for the population born outside the EU 
was 63.3%. Greece, Belgium and France had the lowest 
employment rates among the non-EU population in 2019.8 
Youth employment rates (15-24 years) ranged from 33.7% 
among those born outside the EU, to 35.6% for the native 
population, to 42% for those born in another MS. In 2019, 
the highest employment rates were among those with 
tertiary education, while the lowest among those with lower 
secondary education. These trends are common for the 
female and male population and for natives, those born 
outside the EU or in another MS. All national statistics are 
summarised in the Table 1 in the appendix.
 
Turning to migration flows (defined by the country of birth), 
Eurostat records 3.9 million immigrants to the EU27 in 
2018, and around 2.6 million emigrants in the same year. 
Among them, 2.4 million immigrants to the EU27 were 
from non-EU countries, 1.1 million people emigrated from 
the EU27 to a country outside the EU, and 1.4 million 
people residing in one Member State emigrated to another 
State. In the latest years, the number of extra-EU migrants 
has been higher than intra-EU migrants and reached 
its peak in 2015 with about 2.5 million new migrants, 
followed by a slight decrease according to Eurostat data. In 
absolute numbers, Germany, the UK, Spain, France and Italy 
recorded the highest number of immigrants. But, in relation 
to the total population, Malta and Luxembourg display 
the highest immigration rates.9 The aggregated gender 
distribution of the total immigrant population as recorded 
8 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_ergacob&lang=en
9 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_imm3ctb&lang=en
10 The fiscal impact of ageing populations is expected to be a challenge in almost all MSs over the coming decades. According to Eurostat and 
to a constant scenario, the total cost of the ageing population is projected to increase by 1.7 percentage points to 26.7% of GDP between 2016 
and 2070. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip079_en.pdf.
in 2018 is skewed towards men who comprise 57% of 
the total population. In Spain, France, Cyprus and Portugal 
the proportion of women is higher. Croatia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania have the highest proportion of male immigrants 
in Europe. In 2018, more than three-quarters of the total 
immigrant population in Europe were of working age (15-
64 years). Specifically, the percentage of immigrants aged 
15-64 was 81% of the immigrant population, that of the 
under-15s was 16% and that of the over-65s 2.5%. In 
relation to the total immigrant population, Cyprus, Czechia 
and Croatia have the highest rate of migrant population of 
working age (over 90% of the total migrant population). 
The 25-29 age group is the largest among the immigrated 
population flows.
2.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE 
FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN 
EUROPE
While most of the empirical evidence on the effects of 
immigration has focused on the employment and wage 
impacts of low-skilled workers in receiving countries 
(Dustmann et al., 2013; Nickell and Saleheen, 2015), 
the evidence on the fiscal impact is relatively recent, 
particularly for Europe. The relevance of this topic gained 
traction with the rising immigrant population and concerns 
regarding the sustainability of welfare states, in a context 
of major demographic changes (Lutz et al., 2019) and an 
ageing European society.10
 
The results of the empirical evidence are mixed; however, 
in most cases they suggest a modest impact - on average 
less than +/- 1% of GDP. Empirical investigation on this 
topic can take two approaches: static accounting or 
dynamic approaches. The static accounting approach 
takes a snapshot of public finances in a given year (or 
more years) and apportions contributions paid and benefits 
received to natives and immigrants. The difference between 
contributions and benefits forms the net fiscal impact for 
each group. The dynamic approach instead focuses on 
estimating the Net Present Value (NPV) of immigrants and 
their descendants from their life-cycle perspective. These 
models provide projection results integrated into alternative 
policy scenarios. Results, therefore, depend mainly on the 
set of assumptions about future population trends, labour 
force participation, and government taxes and expenditures. 
Both approaches have a number of advantages and 
disadvantages (Nannestad, 2007; Vargas-Silva, 2014; 
Kaczmarczyk, 2013). One important advantage offered 
by dynamic models is that they offer a forward-looking 
perspective within a life-cycle framework that is considered 
key to inform policy-making (Kaczmarczyk, 2013). 
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2.2 STATIC ACCOUNTING MODELS
The growing literature on recent immigration experiences 
in Europe tries to identify the static fiscal effects of 
immigration, through country-specific and cross-country 
analyses. For Dustmann et al. (2010), the fiscal impact of 
immigration from Central and Eastern European countries 
to the UK has been positive. Immigrants from the A811 are 
on average highly educated and young, however, in the 
period following their entry in UK they receive low wages, 
which gradually increase in subsequent years. Immigrants 
in the UK have higher employment rates than natives. 
Therefore, the socio-demographic characteristics of 
immigrants and the favourable labour market performance 
have determined their positive contribution to the UK’s 
finances. For Chojnicki (2013), the total net contribution 
from immigration to France in 2005 was 3.9 billion euros, 
with an average contribution per immigrant of 800 euros, 
compared to -220 euros from a native. According to this 
analysis, the age structure of the immigrant population 
and the high concentration of immigrants in the active 
age groups drive these results. In a later study on French 
public finances, Chojnicki et al. (2018) analyse the net 
contribution of immigrants defined as any person born 
abroad and without French nationality at birth. The results 
show a low and negative contribution, in the order of 
about ± 0.5% of French GDP for the years 1979-2011. 
The age and education of the migrant population strongly 
influence the results. However, the demographic component 
seems insufficient to produce a positive fiscal contribution 
in the years after the financial crisis of 2008 that led to a 
deterioration in individual economic performance.
 
Martinsen and Rotger (2017) also suggest that the 
different age structure between immigrants and natives 
is the key factor explaining the positive fiscal effect of 
immigration in Denmark. The authors assess the evolution 
of the fiscal contribution according to different degrees of 
mobility in the EU and the accessibility of Danish welfare. 
Through the analysis of repeated cross-sections of the 
entire population of EU citizens in Denmark, they show 
the net positive contribution of EU immigrants between 
2002 and 2013.12
 
Bratsberg et al. (2014) and Ruist (2014) find that the fiscal 
effect depend largely on the performance of migrants in the 
labour market of the host country. Bratsberg et al. (2014) 
show higher welfare dependency rates for immigrants in 
Norway than for natives during the years 1970-2014.13 
Moreover, immigrants from high-income countries perform 
better in the Norwegian labour market than immigrants 
11 A8 refers to immigrants from Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
12 The net positive balance was maintained during the years of the economic crisis, during which contributions from the migrant population 
decreased and expenditure on benefits increased.
13 This analysis does not undertake a complete accounting of the fiscal implications of immigration.
14 In addition, migrants with a high earning potential have stronger incentives to select a destination country that redistributes less income, 
thus maintaining a higher share of their earnings; migrants with a lower earning potential could instead select a country with a more generous 
welfare system.
from developing countries, with lower employment rates 
and higher participation in disability programmes. In 
addition, refugees and immigrant families require more 
social insurance. Ruist (2014) conducts an analysis for 
2011 on the net fiscal contribution of Bulgarian and 
Romanian immigrants in Sweden. Immigrants contributed 
positively with about 3,000 euros per person and year, and 
with immigrants’ contributions exceeding the associated 
public costs by about 30%. For the author, the lack of 
language skills is the main obstacle to access to the 
Swedish labour market, with a potential negative impact 
on the net contribution of the migrant.14
 
Dustmann and Frattini (2014) examine the fiscal impact 
of immigrants in the UK during the period 1995-2011. 
Immigrants from EEA countries have contributed positively 
to the UK’s public finances, while the net fiscal impact of 
non-EEA immigrants was negative. The results are partly 
explained by the higher number of children of non-EEA 
immigrants. The authors also explore the fiscal impact of 
immigrants arriving in the UK after 2000. This group of 
immigrants has made a positive contribution to British 
finances, regardless of origin.  
 
For the OECD (2013), immigrant families in 27 OECD 
countries contributed on average 0.3% of GDP to national 
budgets between 2007 and 2009. Immigrants tend to have 
a less favourable net fiscal position than natives, but their 
net contribution is generally positive. The highest values 
are observed in Luxembourg (2.02%) and Switzerland 
(0.95%), while negative values are observed in Germany 
(-1.13%), France (-0.52%), and in some Eastern European 
countries - Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic 
- with a rather small immigrant population compared to 
the total population. The socio-economic and demographic 
profile of the taxpayer once again explains the national 
results. The negative fiscal effect in Germany is explained 
by the age of the relatively old immigrant population 
and therefore over-represented among those receiving 
age-related benefits. For Ireland, on the other hand, it 
is the impact of the economic crisis that explains the 
deterioration in the economic profile of taxpaying 
households and the resulting in negative fiscal effects. In 
Switzerland and Luxembourg, immigration is a quite recent 
phenomenon with these countries attracting numerous 
and highly skilled individuals, resulting in a positive effect. 
Overall, the most important explanatory factors for the 
results on the net fiscal position are employment and 
age. The differences between immigrants and natives 
with regard to the likelihood of employment - particularly 
among immigrant women - explain about half of the less 
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favourable fiscal position of immigrant families than that 
of native families (OECD, 2013).
 
Bogdanov et al. (2014) analyse a specific set of benefits - 
pensions, health care and disability benefits - and show that 
EU migrants have contributed positively to public finances 
in Austria, Germany and the UK; in the Netherlands, the 
contribution of EU migrants is negative when the impact 
of pensions is excluded. Migrants are mostly young and 
concentrated in the 20-44 age group and therefore receive 
fewer benefits associated with age and health. Although 
they have higher employment rates than nationals, EU 
migrants receive lower wages than natives, which results in 
in lower level of taxes from labour. In addition, immigrants 
are more likely to be at risk of poverty and thus to claim 
more means tested-benefits.
 
The net fiscal effects of intra-EU migrants are positive for 
the years 2004-2015 and for most EEA host countries, 
according to Nyman and Ahlskog (2018). EU migrant 
households have generated a net effect of around ± 
€5,000 per year - about 0.5% of GDP - in 23 of the 29 
countries analysed. Norway shows the most positive net 
balance in favour of EU migrant households, while Poland, 
Slovakia and Estonia show negative fiscal effects from 
the EU migrant population, mostly composed of a high 
proportion of older people.
 
The results of the static analyses discussed in this section 
are strongly dependent on the demographic unit of analysis 
(i.e. individuals or families), age structure, education and 
labour market performance of the different population 
groups, as well as the budget items and years analysed. 
The estimated impact is either positive or negative 
depending on the case considered but it is generally 
moderate. This approach has been used mainly because 
of its methodological simplicity, as it does not require 
assumptions about future demographic trends or public 
spending. However, the results lack a forward-looking 
perspective, which is increasingly required to inform public 
policies on fiscal issues, and which is instead incorporated 
in the dynamic approach described in the next section.
2.3 EVIDENCE FROM DYNAMIC 
MODELLING 
The category of dynamic models includes a number of 
approaches that share the objective of capturing the life 
cycle impact of immigrants, projecting their contributions 
and the costs of public finances into the future. With this 
approach it is possible, for example, to evaluate the 
15 It is also estimated that non-EEA immigrants, with a negative tax contribution in the static analysis, will contribute around £28,000 each in 
the future.
16 Using the VAR technique and looking specifically at asylum seekers, d’Albis et al. (2018) provide dynamic estimates of short and medium-
term fiscal effects in some European Member States. Asylum seekers do not deteriorate the fiscal balance of host countries, as the increase in 
public expenditure driven by asylum seekers is offset by an increase in tax revenues. When asylum seekers become permanent residents, their 
impact becomes positive in both the short and medium term
contribution of immigrants to the long-term financial 
sustainability of the pension system, thus increasing 
the adjustment capacity on the public expenditure side 
of national governments. These approaches, however, 
require relevant theoretical assumptions about the future 
concerning population growth and migration trends, 
changes in employment, public spending and the tax 
system.
 
There are three main dynamic approaches used by the 
empirical literature: Net Present Value Approach (NPV), 
Generational Accounting analysis (GA) and Dynamic 
Applied General Equilibrium Models (DAGEM). The NPV 
approach projects the evolution of the net fiscal impact of 
immigrants during their life in the host country. Results are 
sensitive to assumptions about uncertain future variables, 
including the amount of taxes that immigrants will pay 
or the tax impact of immigrants’ children. The robustness 
of results based on different assumptions is commonly 
examined through alternative scenarios. One example 
of such studies is the report produced by the Migration 
Advisory Committee (2018). This report focuses on the 
cohort of immigrants who arrived in the UK in 2016, and 
with a life-cycle approach, concludes that both EEA and 
non-EEA immigrants should make a positive contribution 
to public finances in the coming decades. The net positive 
contribution to public finances is larger for EU13 migrants 
than for extra-EU migrants, and mainly related to income 
and age. Those of working age will have a positive net fiscal 
contribution, which becomes negative as they age. Those 
arriving as children will potentially have a negative net 
contribution at the beginning, which becomes positive when 
they start working. The report quantifies the contribution 
of the 515,000 immigrants who arrived in the UK in 2016 
at around £26.9 billion during their lifetime.15
 
Other studies conducted in different European countries 
show a negative contribution from new immigrants. 
According to Storesletten (2003), immigration in Sweden 
presents a negative contribution and results are sensitive 
to the assimilation into the job market. With a NPV 
approach for France, Monso (2008) also finds a generally 
negative contribution of immigrants, but a positive one 
from younger and educated immigrants.16
 
The GA approach extends the NPV approach by considering 
the intertemporal distribution of public debt. The tax 
burden on future generations is the difference between 
planned public spending and tax payments of all living 
generations (OECD, 2013). For the application of these 
models, it is necessary to make assumptions about the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government and 
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the tax burden between generations. Collado et al. (2004) 
apply this approach to examine the fiscal impact of 
immigration in Spain. With 1998 as the reference year, and 
by considering three future scenarios based on different 
levels of immigration,17 for the authors the increase in the 
number of new immigrants would significantly reduce the 
fiscal pressure on future native generations. For Austria, 
Mayr (2005) finds a positive fiscal effect for the future, 
mainly due to the age composition of the immigrant 
population and a lower net tax revenue per capita during 
the retirement age. However, increased immigration and 
a skills-based immigration system do not guarantee the 
achievement of an intertemporal fiscal balance. Also for 
Bonin et al. (2000), immigration generates a positive fiscal 
effect and reduces the fiscal burden of future generations 
in Germany.18 However, this effect is not sufficient to 
eliminate the inter-temporal fiscal imbalance resulting 
from the ageing of the German population. 
 
Some studies that take into account the life cycle of 
immigrants in the host country confirm the finding 
that larger fiscal gains may result from an increase in 
educational levels of new immigrants. For Chojnicki (2013), 
the average life-cycle contribution of immigrants present in 
France in 2005 is negative and lower than that of natives. 
However, the impact of immigration on public finances is 
positive in the long-term, reflecting the arrival of young 
and working-age immigrants and the net contribution of 
the immigrants’ offspring. The effects of this impact may 
increase with the expansion of future migratory flows 
and the level of education of immigrants. For Germany, 
Bonin (2017) estimates the potential economic benefits 
of migrant education, finding high effects of skills in both 
the present and the future. While a young low-skilled 
immigrant creates a net cost to the government of 11,000 
euros, a skilled immigrant may generate a net gain of 
154,000 euros, and a highly skilled immigrant creates 
a gain of 440,000 euros. Education plays a crucial role 
in promoting the integration of immigrants and shaping 
their contribution to public finances.
 
The DAGEM approach addresses the direct and indirect 
effects of immigration simultaneously. Unlike the 
other methodologies, general equilibrium models aim 
at addressing more comprehensively the impact of 
immigration on the public finances of host countries.19 
For Ekberg (2011), the expected net contribution of 
new immigrants in Sweden until 2050 is less than 1% 
of GDP. In an optimistic scenario, new immigrants have 
17 The reference scenario assumes a net immigration of 30,000 people per year, similar to the rates observed in Spain. The second scenario 
assumes a future net immigration of zero, while the third scenario considers a net immigration of 100,000 people per year.
18 The positive fiscal contribution of immigration is significantly reduced if the assimilation of future immigrants is low.
19 The dynamic methodologies described before are partial equilibrium analyses as they do not take into account the indirect impact of 
immigration on factors such as wages, savings and consumption.
20 Estimates show a positive contribution of future immigration equivalent to 2.1% labour income tax in the UK, 5.7 points in Austria and 7.3 
points in Germany in 2060.
21 Immigrants have more children because of their age and because they come from countries with higher fertility rates than those in 
European countries. Fertility in most European countries is currently below the replacement level.
the same employment rates and income as the existing 
population and generate a positive contribution to public 
finances. In a pessimistic scenario, immigrants have worse 
working and income conditions than the native population 
generating a negative net contribution. According to this 
author, increasing integration and the employment rate 
among immigrants already residing in Sweden is essential 
to achieve a positive fiscal effect. Chojnicki and Ragot 
(2016) show that immigration has a positive impact in 
France, and according to a scenario without immigration, 
the need to finance social welfare would increase by one 
point of GDP by mid-century. The benefits of immigration 
are linked to their age distribution, on average younger 
than the French population. With a cross-country analysis, 
Berger et al. (2016) conclude that the contribution of 
future immigration varies from country to country and 
depends largely on the volume of immigration and the 
institutional set-up.20
 
Empirical evidence using dynamic methodologies for the 
analysis of immigrants’ entire lives shows mixed results. 
The results are generally influenced by the concentration of 
new immigrants of working age and by characteristics such 
as age, skills, qualifications and therefore their contribution 
to the coffers of the State. The results from alternative 
scenarios for the future - commonly defined on the basis 
of the volume of migration flows and their competences 
- have revealed that some selective migration policies 
have been effective in reducing a certain tax burden in the 
short term, but may not be sufficient to fully counteract 
it in the long run.
 
A general message of this literature is that, while the link 
between the percentage of migrants in total population 
and the fiscal impact is not clear, the demographic and 
socioeconomic profile of migrants has a strong influence 
on this effect in the host country. In particular, the age 
structure of the migrant population is a key factor in 
understanding this effect (Chojnicki, 2013; Martinsen and 
Pons Rotger, 2017). As evidenced in the previous section 
through Eurostat data, immigrants are on average younger 
than natives and are more concentrated in the working age 
groups, often resulting as net contributors to the public 
purse. On the other hand, extra-EU migrants show on 
average lower employment rates than natives, while EU 
migrants have higher rates, leading to a negative impact 
on net fiscal contributions generated by extra-EU migrants 
and a positive one for intra-EU migrants. Also, immigrants 
tend to have more children (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014)21 
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and they tend to be poorer than natives, and therefore 
more likely to claim means tested-benefits (Bogdanov 
et al., 2014). Finally, we should take into account that 
migrants bring with them their human capital while the 
host country did not face their training and education cost. 
The fiscal effect of immigration and natives also evolves 
throughout the life cycle. Generally speaking, individuals 
tend to have a negative net fiscal balance when young 
or old, while their net contribution is high during their 
working life. Compared to the natives, the fiscal effect of 
immigrants follows a different pattern throughout their 
lives, often becoming positive later and negative earlier, 
and generally remaining at a lower level. The net fiscal 
effect is also linked to immigrants’ performance in the 
job market, which in turn is linked to the age, skills and 
economic conditions (Bratsberg et al., 2014; Ruist, 2014; 
Chojnicki et al., 2018). Unskilled migrants are more likely 
than natives or skilled migrants to lose their jobs during 
an economic crisis. Family members and those who come 
as asylum seekers may not work and tend to claim more 
benefits (Bratsberg et al., 2014). Finally, in relation to the 
country of origin, migrants from developing countries are 
more likely to ask for benefits than immigrants from richer 
countries, thus showing different impacts on public finances 
of the host country (Bratsberg et al., 2014).
Source Country Results
Static Approach – Country Analysis
Bratsberg et al. (2014) Norway Higher welfare dependency rates for immigrants compared to 
natives during their life cycle and for the period 1970-2014
Chojnicki (2013) France Static analysis: positive impact for 2005; age of migrants is an 
important explanatory variable. Dynamic analysis: immigration 
impact on public finances is positive in the long term
Chojnicki et al. (2018) France Low and negative net contribution of immigrants. Important 
role of age and education
Dustmann et al. (2010) UK Fiscal position of A8 immigrants assessed as very positive as 
compared to natives
Dustmann and Frattini (2014) UK Immigrants from EEA countries have contributed positively 
to the UK’s public finances. The net fiscal impact of non-EEA 
immigrants has been negative. Recent immigrants have made 
a positive tax contribution
Martinsen & Rotger (2017) Denmark Net positive contribution to the welfare state by EU immigrants. 
Age distribution is the key factor
Ruist (2014) Sweden Migrants from Bulgaria and Romania make a positive 
contribution of around €3,000 per person and year
Static Approach – Cross-Country Analysis
Bogdanov et al. (2014) Austria, Germany, UK, the 
Netherlands
Positive contribution from EU migrants. Demographic profile of 
migrants and employment status main explanatory variables
Nyman and Ahlskog (2018) EEA countries The net fiscal effects of EU migrants are positive for the years 
2004-2015 for most countries
OECD (2013) OECD Mixed results for OECD countries and for the years 2007-
2009; net fiscal position is generally small in terms of GDP; 
employment and age are the most important explanatory 
variables
Dynamic Approach – Country Analysis
Bonin (2017) Germany Education and skills are key factors. The contribution to public 
finances increases as the education of the immigrant increases
Bonin et al. (2000), Germany Immigration generates a positive effect and reduces the fiscal 
burden on future generations
Chojnicki and Ragot (2016) France Positive impact. Under the zero immigration scenario, the need 
to finance social welfare would increase by one point of GDP 
by mid-century
Collado et al. 2004 Spain Positive impact and immigration is a significant factor improving 
fiscal position of Spain
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
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Ekber (2011) Sweden Net contribution until 2050 is less than 1% of GDP. Positive 
contribution under optimistic scenario. Employment and 
integration are main explanatory variables
MAC (2018) UK EEA and non-EEA immigrants may contribute positively to public 
finances. This effect is correlated to earnings and age
Mayr (2005) Austria Positive fiscal effect in the future. Favourable age composition 
is an important explanatory factor  
Monso (2008) France General negative contribution of immigrants. Younger and 
educated immigrants may generate a positive contribution
Storesletten (2003) Sweden Negative contribution of immigration. Results are sensitive to 
the assimilation of immigrants into the job market.  
Dynamic Approach – Cross-Country Analysis
Berger et al. (2016) Cross-country analysis Contribution of future immigration varies from country to country. 
It depends on the volume of immigration and the institutional 
set-up
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3. MICROSIMULATION 
MODELLING
22 The match between EUROMOD input data and UDB-SILC data is exact for most countries by using personal and household IDs. However, for 
eleven out of the 28 EU countries, this matching procedure does not work as household and individual IDs are not the same in the two surveys. 
Therefore, we perform the match based on age, gender and sampling weights for Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Spain.
23 In case there is no clear evidence on which household member is taking up a benefit, the benefit is assigned to the household head. On 
average, this leads to an underestimation (overestimation) of net fiscal effects for men (women).
3.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1.1 EUROMOD
We evaluate the fiscal impact of migration using EUROMOD, 
the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European 
Union (Sutherland, 2007). EUROMOD simulates individual 
and household tax liabilities and benefit entitlements 
based on the policy rules in place in each EU member 
state (Sutherland and Figari, 2013). EUROMOD is a unique 
tool for comparative research on the effects of taxes 
and benefits at EU level as it calculates, in a comparable 
manner, the static effects of the tax-benefit system on 
household and individual incomes for each EU member 
state and for the EU as a whole. The data source used 
in EUROMOD is individual micro-data based on EU-SILC. 
 
The advantage of EUROMOD is that it allows to assess 
policy changes over time, for example to show the extent to 
which changes in policies limiting the requisites for benefit 
entitlement only to natives or to Intra-EU immigrants 
contribute to reducing the net fiscal effects of extra-EU 
migrants but at the same time increasing income inequality 
and poverty. Additionally, EUROMOD allows to aggregate 
benefits in a harmonized way across all EU countries. 
Baseline systems in EUROMOD are micro validated, which 
means the results of the simulations are close to the 
observed individual and household information of the 
EU-SILC. Additionally, the baseline systems of EUROMOD 
are macro-validated based on information from external 
sources on expenditures and the number of benefit 
recipients.
 
For the purpose of this research, EUROMOD 2015 tax-
benefit systems (data from EU-SILC, 2015) have been 
adapted by adding additional available resources in 
terms of data and policies for migrants who reside in 
the EU area to improve the analysis of the fiscal cost 
of migrants. For example, EUROMOD input data lacks 
information on the year of immigration in the country 
which is necessary for calculating the duration of stay 
in one country, an important indicator of the integration 
of newcomers. Therefore, we merge the EUROMOD input 
data with the original EU-SILC data to recover this key 
information for the purpose of the study.22 Additionally, 
the foreign population is underrepresented in EU-SILC data 
and therefore a reweighting of observations is needed to 
make the data consistent with each country’s underlying 
population. Most important, the coding of some policies is 
further modified in EUROMOD to account for the fact that 
some benefits are conditional on permanent residence or 
a minimum amount of years spent in the country.23
 
The simulation of mean-tested and non-mean tested 
benefits in EUROMOD for foreigners is developed 
by complementing existing country-specific policies 
with additional conditionality assumptions on benefit 
entitlements. These additional conditionality assumptions 
consist in the legal requirements related to the years of 
residence in the EU hosting country, more specifically “the 
year of immigration in the country”. This variable is needed 
for the assessment of the relevant income period for some 
policy simulation in EUROMOD, such as unemployment or 
old age pensions that require a period spent in the country 
before becoming eligible for the benefit. Furthermore, using 
the information on arrival year in the country, we assume 
that a migrant is entitled to one or more benefits depending 
on their length of stay in the country. 
 
One of the main non-mean tested benefits is the 
unemployment benefit, which in most of the countries 
can be claimed only if someone has worked longer than 
a minimum mandated period: if the years of stay in the 
country is lower than the legal threshold required to 
claim the benefit we assume no claim on the benefit. One 
example might help clarify our procedure. Let us consider 
the change in the coding of unemployment benefit in 
one EU country. In Italy, for example, eligible individuals 
for ordinary unemployment benefits are employees who 
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have paid (i) contribution against unemployment for at 
least two years or (ii) 52 weeks of contribution in the 
two-year period before the date of work suspension. We 
reflect this eligibility condition in EUROMOD by allowing 
only immigrants who on top of being eligible for ordinary 
unemployment benefits, are living in Italy for more than 
two years to claim this unemployment benefit. 
 
In addition, there might be other types of non-mean tested 
benefits that cannot be given to immigrants. For example, 
child benefit for Student Parent in Denmark that is given 
to parents in tertiary education. Extra-EU immigrants are 
not eligible for this benefit and this eligibility condition is 
reflected in EUROMOD for Denmark. 
On the other hand, there is a substantial variety of 
mean-tested benefits policies that need modifications for 
incorporating a specific migrant component in EUROMOD. 
One of them is represented by family benefits. For example, 
for receiving the family bonus in Vienna, the parents have 
to live in the same house with the child. Furthermore, at 
least one parent has to be Austrian citizen and at the time 
of the birth needs to have his principal residence in Vienna 
for at least 1 year. Parents without Austrian citizenship 
need to have their principal residence in Vienna for at least 
3 years. EEA-citizens are equated to Austrian citizens. 
 
Another example of mean-tested benefit is the new born 
bonus in Italy. The bonus corresponds to 80 Euro per month 
for a maximum of three years given to “children of Italian 
citizens or of a Member State of the European Union and 
non-EU citizens with residence permits” per each child 
born before December 2015. It is subject to a means-test 
verified by using the ISEE (Indicator of Equivalent Economic 
Situation) which cannot be higher than 25.000 euro per 
year. If the ISEE is below 7.000 euro per year, the amount 
of the bonus is 160 euro per month. As we cannot observe 
in the data whether an immigrant holds a residence permit, 
we assume that immigrants who entered in Italy in the 
last five years are eligible for this child-related benefit.
 
The simulation of benefits in EUROMOD is needed to 
estimate the intended effects of tax-benefit system and 
to correct for the misreporting of benefits, in particular in 
the bottom of the distribution (Figari et al., 2012). Take 
up rates are not modified in the model. Importantly, due 
to the lack of information on eligibility requirements, not 
all benefits are simulated in EUROMOD. For example, 
contributory benefits are taken from the data due to lack 
of pertinent information needed to simulate them. 
3.2 IMPUTATION OF IN-KIND 
BENEFITS AND INDIRECT TAXES 
Similarly to standard micro-simulation models, we use 
24 See Jasso et al. (2004), Antecol and Bedard (2006) for studies in the US and Donovan et al. (1992), Chiswick et al. (2008), and Powles 
(1990) for studies in Australia.
EUROMOD for simulating direct taxes and cash benefits. 
Yet, two important components of taxes and social benefits, 
namely in-kind benefits and consumption taxes, are 
missing in the standard EUROMOD model which need to 
be considered.
 
First, a good part of income redistribution occurs through 
in-kind benefits that represent a fiscal cost for the public 
purse. The largest share of public in-kind transfers in 
OECD countries is related to health care, followed by 
education, childcare, housing and active labour market 
policies. According to the OECD Health Statistics 2019, on 
average, OECD countries spent 8.8% of their GDP on health 
in 2018. Second, consumption taxes are a substantial 
component in the country tax system. As shown by OECD 
statistics for 2018, the total share of government revenue 
raised via consumption is about one third, which is much 
higher than the direct income tax (Decoster et al., 2010). 
Despite the importance attached to in-kind benefits and 
indirect taxes, these components of tax-transfer system 
are not simulated in EUROMOD due to the lack of direct 
information on expenditures and non-cash income in the 
underlying EU-SILC data. However, to have a broad picture 
of the fiscal effects of immigration, a full comprehension 
of the welfare system is needed. Therefore, we separately 
calculate indirect taxes and in-kind benefits and further 
merge them with the EUROMOD output data. The approach 
is similar to the one followed by Figari and Paulus (2015) 
where the three “I” - indirect taxes, imputed rent and in-kind 
benefits – were used to extend the standard disposable 
income. 
3.2.1 IMPUTATION OF IN-KIND 
BENEFITS
Below, we describe the imputed in-kind benefits and the 
method of imputation. In-kind benefits are non-cash 
benefits (such as the cost for health care covered by the 
state). We calculated those benefits based on EUROSTAT 
aggregate statistics on expenditures on health, education 
and social housing and then apportioned based on 
observed information. We identify recipients of in-kind 
benefits related to social housing (at household level) and 
education (at individual level) in the micro-data. 
 
For in-kind health benefits, we assign them according to 
age groups in the micro data based on the OECD statistics 
on the distribution of total cost for public health care. 
Nevertheless, this imputation method does not account 
for the potential difference in use between natives and 
intra-EU migrants and extra-EU migrants. In fact, there is 
a wide range of literature dedicated to “health immigrant 
effect” from a time path perspective.24 It says that the 
health of immigrants is substantially better than that of 
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comparable natives just at arrival at the host country but 
deteriorates with the duration of migration. The “healthy 
immigrant effect” is attributed to a number of factors. For 
example, healthier people are more likely to immigrate. On 
top of that, an important factor may be the underutilization 
of health care services by immigrants. There are studies 
showing that migrants are often unaware of the health care 
opportunities at their disposal and due to language barriers 
might miss appropriate information on health care in the 
hosting country. Migrants are also more likely to mistrust 
the medical system due to cultural and economic barriers 
or discrimination reasons.25 While the “healthy immigrant 
effect” might lead us to overstating the in-kind benefit in 
the form of health assistance that migrants receive in 
the hosting country, it has to be noted that the sorting 
of immigrants into more dangerous occupations will bias 
our imputation in the other direction. Taken together, we 
believe that the first effect dominates and our imputation 
overstated the health benefits that migrants enjoy. 
 
In this study, we include three types of in-kind 
benefits: 1) health related benefits, 2) education 
related benefits and 3) social housing benefits. 
 
1) Health related benefits are calculated based on 
EUROSTAT information on general government expenditure 
in 2014. Such expenditures include medical products, 
appliances and equipment (01), outpatient services 
(02), hospital services (03), public health services (04), 
R&D in Health (05), Health for non-specified categories 
(06). The average per capita expenditure on health are 
apportioned by age groups based on the OECD statistics 
on the distribution of total cost for public health care 
by age class for the Netherlands in year 2011 (OECD, 
2017).26 Our assumption is that this is representative 
of distribution of health care expenditure across the EU 
countries by age classes, and that this distribution does 
not change over time. These assumptions are strong, but 
this is the only information available on general health 
costs by age classes in the EU area.
 
2) Education related benefits are calculated based on 
EUROSTAT statistics on the total public expenditure on 
education per full-time equivalent student by education 
level and type of program (EUROSTAT database), which 
is available for most EU countries for year 2014. The 
total education expenditures are apportioned based on 
the observed information on the current education level 
in the micro data and are then assigned to the person in 
education. For some countries (Czech Republic, France, 
Ireland), the dataset for 2013 is used (as the 2014 dataset 
is missing), and updated to 2014 equivalent by using 
the country-specific consumer price index, assuming no 
25 For a review of factors driving the health deterioration see Neuman (2014) and Constant et al. (2014)
26 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=30117
27 EUROSTAT educ-uoe-enra02 database, namely Pupils and students enrolled by education level, sex and age, and EUROSTAT educ-uoe-
fine02 database, namely Public educational  expenditure by education level, programme orientation, type of source and expenditure category
expenditure change in real terms. For countries with missing 
information (such as Croatia for all levels of education 
and Denmark for primary and secondary education), other 
available sources are used27 and per capita expenditure 
are computed as the ratio between total expenditures 
over the number of students/pupils by educational level. 
For countries without any information on education 
expenditure, such as Croatia and Greece, we calculate the 
per capita expenditure as a weighted average of similar 
countries normalized by per capita GDP. For example, for 
Greece, the average of education expenditures of three 
southern European countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) 
is used to proxy the per capita educational expenditure 
while for Croatia, the information on Romania, Bulgaria 
and Slovenia is considered. 
 
3) Social housing benefits are calculated based on 
COFOG database on the total amount spent by public 
authorities or public institutions for housing and community 
amenities, which include housing development, community 
development, water supply, street lighting, R&D housing 
and communities amenities. We then use SILC-provided 
information regarding the tenure status of households 
to obtain an estimate of the number of individuals living 
in social housing, which is used to compute an estimate 
of the average cost of social housing in each EU country. 
Again, the in-kind benefits for social housing are further 
assigned to the household head.
It is important to note that because of the lack of reliable 
information in the EU-SILC data, we don’t impute in-kind 
benefits related to child-care and elderly care or public 
transportation although many EU countries spend relatively 
large amounts on the public provision and subsidization 
of these goods (Kleven, 2014).  
3.2.2 MODELLING OF INDIRECT TAXES 
To account for indirect taxation, we include information on 
household expenditures from the HBS (Household Budget 
Survey) from 2010 (latest available data). The HBS data set 
contains detailed information on household expenditures 
for several EU countries. The HBS is a sample survey where 
the statistical units of interest are private households. 
It is carried out regularly under the responsibility of the 
National Statistical Offices (NSIs) in each EU Member 
State. The countries provide information about household 
final consumption expenditure on goods and services 
with considerable detail in the categories used, plus 
information on income and some additional demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics. One should note 
that there is a great freedom for each Member State 
to decide on the objectives, methodology, programming 
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and resource allocation for their respective HBS.28 
The value-added tax (VAT) is a consumption tax that 
aims to tax the sale of goods and services to the final 
consumer along the whole supply chain. It is defined as 
a percent of the purchase price, including potential other 
taxes or excises. Theoretically, the tax burden is borne 
by the end consumer but there are several reasons, why 
businesses sometimes bear some of it. For example, some 
services are exempted from VAT, which means that the 
service provider cannot recover the VAT paid on the inputs 
needed to provide exempted services (e.g. health care). 
Additionally, businesses are restricted to deduct certain 
inputs (e.g. corporate gifts or inputs not used for business 
activity). Consistently with the literature and for simplicity, 
we assume that the end consumer (the households) are 
bearing the whole VAT burden.29
 
In most countries, goods can be taxed at the standard 
rate, the reduced rates, the zero VAT-rate or can be VAT-
exempted. We take information on the types of goods 
that are taxed together with their rate in each MS from 
the ‘Worldwide VAT, GST and Sales Tax Guide 2015’ of 
Earnest and Young that reports detailed information on 
indirect taxes around the world. This guide summarizes 
the value-added tax, goods and services tax and sales tax 
systems in 122 jurisdictions. We use for our simulations 
the information on tax laws for 2015. Our result should 
be interpreted as a rough approximation for the VAT tax 
burden, keeping in mind that the information on detailed 
consumption of goods and services, as well as information 
on the taxation of certain goods and services, are not 
complete.
 
The general framework for the VAT systems of the EU 
member states is based on the EU VAT Directive, which 
obliges member states to have a VAT rate of at least 15 
percent standard rate and allows for reduced rates for 
certain categories of goods and services. Member states 
have therefore a wide flexibility in setting the VAT rates, 
leading to substantial differences in the national VAT 
systems. Most of the consumption in the EU countries is 
taxed by a standard value added tax rate. This standard 
VAT rate varies substantially across EU countries in 
2015, from 17 percent in Luxembourg to 27 percent in 
Hungary. Additionally, on certain products, a reduced VAT 
rate applies. For example, food is taxed at a reduced rate. 
Some countries have even more than one reduced VAT 
rate. Luxembourg and France had in total four different 
VAT rates in 2015. Additionally, to those rates, many 
countries have exempted some goods and services from 
VAT. Typically, this are financial services, health services 
and education.
 
Additional taxes, so called excises, are typically added 
28 Note, that for some countries information on country of birth and citizenship is missing in the HBS, namely in Greece, Finland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and the UK. For Germany and Spain, we have to use the information of citizenship instead
29 Even though this is a standard assumption in indirect tax modelling, it is a strong assumption. See e.g. Abramovsky et al. (2011) for a 
discussion on the pass-through
on some goods, such as alcohol, gasoline, diesel, oil or 
cigarettes. In our model, we focus purely on the value-
added taxes, leaving excises out of the model. This is 
mainly due to the fact, that excises are often based on 
the amount rather than on the price of a certain good 
(such as tobacco). In our data, we can only observe the 
expenditures related to the goods. Therefore calculating 
the excises in a proper way is not possible. 
 
In general, the value-added taxes on products vary 
substantial across the member states, as Table 1 in 
Annex 1 depicts. Also the group of goods and services 
are taxed on a reduced rate or that are exempted from 
VAT differs substantially between countries. Quite detailed 
information on the consumption behaviour is needed to 
estimate the VAT paid by households. Even though the 
HBS data is quite detailed, there are some limitations in 
identifying the expenses that are taxed on a reduced rate 
or exempted from VAT. We try to cover those categories as 
good as possible, but obviously there are some limitations 
in our approach that might lead to slight over or under-
estimation in the VAT.
 
Based on HBS data, indirect taxes are simulated for all 
European countries and covers all the applicable VAT 
rates - the standard VAT rates and the main reduced 
rates for the year 2015. Excises (applicable to goods 
consumed by households) are not included in the analysis. 
The calculations of the VAT covers the standard rate, the 
reduced rates, the zero VAT rate and the VAT exempted 
goods. Since we assume full pass through of indirect 
taxes on to the consumer, the model does not distinguish 
between a zero rate and VAT exemption.
 
In a first step, we analyse consumption patterns of natives 
and migrants. The HBS, similar to the EU-SILC data set, 
contains information on citizenship as well as country 
of birth, split in three groups: National, Non-National 
but EU-National, Non-National and Non-EU-National for 
most of the countries. For consistency, we again define 
migrants by country of birth. By simulating the indirect 
taxation, we can see not only that migrants and natives 
show different consumption patterns, but also different 
indirect tax burden. On the one hand, migrants tend to 
save more, therefore consuming less and paying less VAT. 
On the other hand, migrants have often lower incomes 
and those groups typically bear a higher share of indirect 
taxes. Therefore it is important to distinguish between 
migrant and native households, when implementing the 
indirect taxation in our data set. 
 
We assume that the VAT burden of the household is split 
according to the individual income share of the household. 
Therefore, we are able to calculate the individual VAT 
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burden. By using simple regression methods, we estimate 
the VAT burden of households, depending on the overall 
income of the household, as well as on socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as migration status, household type, 
number of children and so on.30 We use the estimated 
parameters, to impute the VAT burden of household in 
the EU-SILC data.31 There are different methods to impute 
the VAT burden in the EU-SILC data , but since the main 
interest in this research falls on the average VAT burden 
by age groups and immigration status, we argue that 
implementing VAT rates in this way is the most convenient. 
In the literature, VAT rates are often implemented on an 
aggregated level by income deciles (see e.g. Dustmann 
and Frattini, 2014). The method used in this research has 
an advantage over standard approaches as we don’t lose 
in heterogeneity and maintain the micro-level structure. 
This allows distinguishing between different expenditure 
and saving behaviour between migrants and natives.
 
We face several data issues when imputing the VAT 
behaviour from the HBS in EU-SILC. First, countries like 
Austria and the Netherlands are not included in the HBS 
2010 wave. Therefore, the imputation of VAT is done based 
on other data sources or imputation methods. For example, 
for Austria we use the national HBS of Statistics Austria for 
2009/2010 and the Indirect Tax Tool of the Commission to 
calculate VAT taxes for all households. On the other hand, 
for Netherlands, we follow the approach used by Dustmann 
and Frattini (2014) using information on effective VAT 
rates by income quintile (Bettendorf and Cnossen, 2014) 
to impute the VAT tax burden of households. Both these 
imputations do not permit to distinguish between migrant 
and native consumption patterns, as no information 
is available on the country of origin. Second, for Italy, 
information on income are missing in the HBS. Therefore, 
we impute the VAT assuming a constant saving rate 
of 10.52 as reported by EUROSTAT for the year 2015. 
Lastly, due to problems with the income data in the HBS 
for Luxembourg, Luxembourg is not considered in this 
research. 
3.2.3 SIMULATION OF CASH BENEFITS 
AND DIRECT TAXES USING EUROMOD
Tax and benefit systems differ substantially across 
EU member states. Nevertheless, EUROMOD allows 
aggregating all the benefits and taxes in each country 
in a comprehensive way. By taking advantage of this 
aggregation feature of EUROMOD (see a detailed 
description in Annex 1) we aggregate the calculated 
outcome variables into several categories according to 
the nature of the variables themselves. 
 
30 Age is not included among the explanatory variables because appears to be collinear with other variables such as activity status. In fact, the 
age group 30-60 is captured by activity/inactivity dummy variable, while the age group older than 60 by retirement dummy
31 See, among others, De Agostini et al. (2017), who use an Engle’s curve approach, but also other methods are discussed in the literature
On government expenditures side, we have 
information about the following cash benefits 
received by every individual in the survey (EU-SILC): 
• family and child benefits, which include child care and 
child education, family, maternity and parental leave 
benefits;
• health and health related benefits and pensions, which 
include accident, receiving care, caring, disability and 
health benefits, disability and health pensions;
• housing benefits and pensions, which include housing, 
heating and municipality benefits;
• old age and age related benefits and pensions, which 
include old age, survivors and early retirement benefits, 
civil servant, minimum, old age, survivors and early 
retirement pensions;
• work related benefits, which include unemployment and 
work related benefits;
• social assistance benefits and pensions, which include 
social assistance and military benefits;
In terms of direct benefits received, we therefore 
aggregate the benefits to the following categories: 
• “BENEFITS: unemployment”: Covers all unemployment 
benefits (contributory, as well as non-contributory) as 
well as work-related benefits. 
• “BENEFITS: pension”: Covers all pension benefits 
(survivor pensions, old-age pensions)
• “BENEFITS: rest”: Covers all the additional benefits, 
such as family benefits, health benefits, housing benefits 
and social assistance benefits
 
On the government revenue side, we have information 
on income and other type of taxes as well as on social 
security contributions. We aggregate them as follows: 
• “TAXES: on income”: Covers all taxes on income 
(labour income, capital income, property income and 
other specific taxes such as church, health, municipal, 
pension insurance, wealth and early retirement tax) that 
are simulated in EUROMOD.
• “TAXES: social insurance contributions”: Covers all 
social security contributions paid by the employer, the 
employee and the self-employed.
 
To calculate the final net contribution of individuals 
we subtract the sum of all benefits received from 
the individual from the contributions (income 
taxes and social insurance contributions) made: 
 
• “NET Contributions (contributions - benefits)”: Covers all 
individual contributions net of benefits received.
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3.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, we describe the evolution of net fiscal 
contributions and tax benefit components by cohorts, 
gender and education level, separately for natives, extra-
EU migrants and intra-EU migrants, at EU level.32 Figure 2 
32 Luxembourg is excluded because of lack of information on migration status
shows a large variation across cohorts as well as between 
natives and migrants in terms of net fiscal contributions. 
Overall, the net fiscal effects are positive and monotonically 
increasing until a certain age and they become negative 
and decreasing thereafter. The positive peak in net 
contributions is reached faster for natives compared to 
FIGURE 2. NET FISCAL EFFECT BY ITS MAIN COMPONENTS AND MIGRATION STATUS EU-27 – TOTAL POPULATION 
SOURCE: JRC OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON EUROMOD.
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migrants and it coincides with their retirement age. Overall, 
for most of working life, per capita contributions of natives 
are higher than those of intra-EU migrants. Even more so 
than for the non-EU born migrants. This reflects earnings’ 
differences between Natives and migrants, which, in turn, 
is related to differences in their labour market participation 
and differences in wages. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that around the age of fifty, per capita contributions 
of intra-EU migrants exceed those of natives.
Decomposing the net fiscal effect by its main components 
as shown in Figure 2 reveals that expenditures for pensions 
and other old-age related benefits account for a very 
high share of social expenditures. Conversely, social 
security contributions account for the highest share of 
fiscal contributions, followed by taxes on income, and 
taxes on consumption. When comparing natives with 
non-EU born migrants, three noticeable facts emerge: 
1) natives contribute more than non-EU born migrants 
in income taxes; 2) pensions amounts are higher for 
natives than non-EU born migrants; 3) social transfer 
are higher for non-EU born migrants than natives. The 
first and second fact can be readily explained with 
natives’ higher current wages and past social security 
contributions respectively. The third fact is mostly explained 
by differences in socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as family composition, number of children, 
number of people employed within a family and so on. 
 
Gender differences seem to be also important for shaping 
net fiscal effects. Figure 3 shows how men contribute more 
than women in public finance and similarly receive more in 
pensions. This is to be expected once considering gender pay 
and participation gap present in most EU countries. Non-EU 
born migrant women contribute less than the rest of women, 
due to their low participation rate in labour market, but, at 
the same time, they take back less in pension entitlements. 
 
Lastly, we look at the differences by education level. As 
indicated by Figure 4, there are no striking differences in 
net fiscal effects between highly educated migrants and 
natives. In fact, the shape of the net fiscal contributions 
is very similar. The picture looks very different for low 
educated population: natives and non-EU born migrants 
behave very similarly while Intra-EU migrants do not. 
Indeed, Intra-EU migrants contribute significantly more 
than the rest of population and as a result receive more 
in pensions.
FIGURE 3. NET FISCAL EFFECT BY GENDER AND MIGRATION STATUS, EU-27 (WITHOUT LU) 
SOURCE: JRC OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON EUROMOD.
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FIGURE 4. NET FISCAL EFFECT BY EDUCATION AND MIGRATION STATUS, EU-27 (WITHOUT LU) 
SOURCE: JRC OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON EUROMOD.
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3.4 ESTIMATING LIFE-CYCLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS
The goal of our research is to feed a demographic model 
with parameters capturing net fiscal effect differences as 
derived from the micro data (described in the previous 
chapter). To estimate the parameters on fiscal impact over 
the life cycles, we run simple regressions that explain the 
net contributions for the three sub-groups - natives, intra-
EU migrants and extra-EU migrants - in separate models. 
We additionally estimate separate regression models for 
the working age and the old-age population sub-samples. 
The predictions of those models allows us to account for 
differences in net fiscal contributions between the three 
categories considered.
 
In a first step, we estimate at the country level the net fiscal 
contributions in the working age population, depending 
on the specific age group (five-year groups), the labour 
market status (employed, unemployed or inactive), the 
education level33 (low, middle or high educated), gender 
as well as the interaction between gender and age groups. 
The interaction term allows for different age patterns by 
gender, which we detected in the micro data. Additionally, 
for the regressions run on intra-EU migrants and extra-
EU migrants, the duration of stay (in five year groups) is 
included as an explanatory variable, since longer duration 
of stay might reflect a better integration and impact the 
net fiscal contributions. The information on labour-market 
status is not used when estimating old-age net fiscal 
contributions (65 years and older).
 
While for most countries we have sufficient observations 
on both intra-EU migrants and extra-EU migrants, for 
many Eastern European and Baltic countries,34 we do 
not. Nevertheless, we assume that they share certain 
similarities, such as low immigration flows, and run a joint 
regression model for those countries but accounting for 
country specific differences captured by country dummies. 
In other words, we assume similar age/net-contribution 
profiles in those countries, but allow them to be higher or 
lower, depending on the country. The estimated coefficients 
are used to feed the demographic model.
 
For some countries, such as Malta and Latvia, we do not 
have sufficient information for Intra-EU migrants and 
extra-EU migrants. Therefore, we only distinguish between 
Natives and Migrants in those countries. Similarly, for 
Germany, EUROMOD does not distinguish between intra-
EU migrants and extra-EU migrants. Since Germany is an 
important country regarding both intra-EU migrants and 
extra-EU migrants, we use a probabilistic approach based 
on the LFS 2018 where this information is collected. To be 
33 The education levels are defined by the corresponding ISCED-levels (low: ISCED 1+2, middle: ISCED 3+4, high: ISCED 5+6).
34 We pool Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, together.
35 We add also a random error term that follows the distribution of the residuals in the original estimation, to increase heterogeneity in the 
results.
36 See Istenic et al. (2016).
more specific, we estimate the probability of being an EU 
mobile citizen in the LFS based on certain characteristics of 
migrants such as education, number of children, duration 
of stay, age, education. Next, we use these estimated 
probabilities35 to split non-natives in the original SILC data 
into intra-EU migrants and extra-EU migrants, in such a 
way that immigrants with highest probability of being 
an EU mobile citizen based on their socio-demographic 
characteristics are considered as EU mobile. It is important 
to note that this is a probabilistic assignment and therefore 
the estimates for Germany should be interpreted with 
caution.
 
The estimated coefficients of the regressions show that 
women contribute less than men during working age, but 
also receive less in the old age in most countries, due to 
lower wages, more part-time work arrangements, child 
care responsibilities and other factors. This also leads 
to lower benefit entitlements (e.g. pensions) in the old 
age. As expected, the lower is the educational level, the 
lower are the contributions during working age, which is 
mainly driven by lower wages and scarcer job opportunities. 
Not surprisingly, being unemployed or inactive leads to 
a strong reduction in net contributions, compared to 
employed individuals. This effect is even stronger for 
unemployed, because they receive higher benefits than 
inactive people do. The impact of duration of stay on net 
fiscal contributions depends highly on the country and 
may reflect differences in migration patterns and the level 
of integration across the European states. We report the 
prediction for each country regression model in the country 
fiches in Annex 2. 
 
To assess the external validity of our approach, we compare 
the estimated net fiscal impact (natives, Intra-EU migrants 
and extra-EU migrants) based on our micro data to the 
European National Transfer Accounts (NTA) 2010.36 The NTA 
approach measures net contributions in a slightly different 
way. Net contributions, called net public transfers in the 
NTA framework, are defined as the difference between 
public transfer inflows and outflows. Inflows of the public 
sector (from a household perspective) include both, in-
kind transfers and cash transfers. Public transfer inflows 
in kind consist of individual public consumption (e.g. public 
health care) as well as collective consumption expenditure. 
Cash transfer are benefits received from the state. Public 
transfer outflows measure the flows of economic resources 
from the private sectors to the public sector. They include 
taxes (on asset income, labour income and consumption), 
social contributions and other revenues paid by the private 
sector to the government.
 
There are two main reasons why our approach 
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and the NTA approach can lead to different results: 
• We are using data based on EU-SILC, 2015, while the 
NTA approach is based on 2010 data. Wage growth, 
changes in the population structure, as well as policy 
changes in this period can significantly affect the 
revenues related to both benefit and contribution side 
in our model. Additionally, inflation should potentially 
lead to higher monetary values in general.
• Our approach covers only in-kind benefits for health, 
education and housing, while the NTA approach is 
able to cover all in-kind benefits. This implies that net-
fiscal impacts might be overestimated in our approach. 
Furthermore, we apportion in-kind benefits on education 
to children while the NTA to parents. 
 
Therefore, the validity of our approach versus the NTA 
approach should be assessed by keeping in mind these 
caveats as well as those differences in methods and data 
used. Nonetheless, as the figures in the country fiches (see 
Annex 2) show, our model predictions are fairly close to 
the results obtained by the NTA approach. For all countries, 
the life-cycle perspective of natives has the same shape 
as the one suggested for the whole population by the 
NTA. Nevertheless, and in line with our expectations, we 
can typically see an upward-shift of the curve, due to the 
reasons mentioned above.
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4. DEMOGRAPHIC 
MICROSIMULATION
37 CEPAM-Mic is a dynamic microsimulation projection model developed by the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM), a 
partnership between the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). https://bluehub.jrc.ec.europa.eu/catalogues/info/dataset/pj00207
38 CEPAM-Mic also projects religion and language spoken at home, which are important dimensions of the cultural aspects of immigration, but 
these ethno cultural variables are not used in this analysis.
39 The two most recent waves of the EU-LFS Survey (2014 and 2015) available at the time the project started were merged to increase the 
sample size, with the total base population numbering near 8.3 million cases
We use CEPAM-Mic to project both the cross-sectional 
(population-based) and the life course (cohort-based) 
estimates of future net fiscal contributions in the EU 
countries.37 This microsimulation model, developed by 
Bélanger et al. (2019), is designed to provide prospective 
analyses of the socio-economic and cultural consequences 
of population changes in high immigration countries.
 
In addition to the age and gender dimensions of a classical 
cohort-component demographic projection model, CEPAM-
Mic includes information on education, labour force 
participation and employment status and immigration-
related variables such as the region of birth, age at 
immigration and duration of residency in host country. 
Those additional dimensions prove useful in assessing 
the future economic integration of immigrants.38
 
The next subsection presents the main characteristics of 
the CEPAM-Mic microsimulation model used to generate 
the projected results. Then, a subsection explains the 
main differences between the population-based and 
the cohort based estimates and the section concludes 
with a presentation of the assumptions supporting each 
alternative scenario.
4.1 CEPAM-MIC MICROSIMULATION 
MODEL
Unlike the traditional cohort-component projection method, 
which uses aggregated population estimates as inputs and 
outputs, CEPAM-Mic microsimulation model operates at the 
individual level. The main advantage of microsimulation is 
that it allows the simultaneous projection of a large number 
of dimensions going beyond the limits of conventional 
projection models based on aggregated data. CEPAM-Mic 
projects the population of EU27 member states under 
several socioeconomic and ethno cultural dimensions. Its 
base population counts 13 variables: age, sex, country 
of residence, education level, student status, education 
of the mother, labour force participation, employment, 
region of birth (11 clusters of world countries), age at 
immigration, duration of residence in the host country for 
migrants, religion and language. The base population was 
created from the EU-Labour Force Survey microdata files 
and other surveys such as the European Social Survey to 
impute some characteristics not available in the EU-LFS.39
 
CEPAM-Mic projects the occurrence and timing of 
demographic and socio-economic events that shape 
future characteristics of individuals and their future 
offspring based on a series of interrelated multivariate 
prediction models. The model is time-based and event-
based, dynamic, in continuous time, open to international 
migration, and stochastic. The model is dynamic and in 
continuous time, meaning that characteristics of individuals 
are modified continuously in “real time”, which allows 
for an easier treatment of competing events. For each 
potential event (giving birth, aging, migrating to another 
country, graduating, entering the labour force, dying, etc.) 
that can occur to a simulated actor, regression or other 
estimation models were constructed to estimate the 
parameters for each individual characteristics taken into 
account to determine the probability of its occurrence 
and derive its waiting time. Then, the individual waiting 
times of all events are ordered and the shortest waiting 
time becomes the next event. When an event occurs, the 
characteristic of the simulated actor specific to this event 
(e.g., increasing age, changing education level or changing 
country of residence, etc.) is changed and waiting times 
are re-estimated accordingly and the projection continues 
with the next event until death, emigration or the horizon 
of the projection (Belanger et al., 2019).
 
It is important to note that each event can have its own set 
of determinants. The parameters of the different modules 
deriving the waiting time of each event are estimated 
from different micro-data sources. Belanger et al. (2019) 
provide an overview of the parameters driving all the 
modules generating events. Marois et al. (2019) provide 
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a detailed description of the labour force module and 
Marois et al., (2019b) describe the education module while 
Potančoková and Marois (forthcoming) describe the fertility 
module. The methodology for estimating the parameters 
of the fiscal contributions and social benefits of each 
individual taking into account his or her characteristics is 
explained in the subsections 3.1-3.4 of this report. The 
following subsections present the base population and a 
short description of the other modules.
4.2 SCENARIOS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The main objective of this Section is to assess the 
fiscal impact of immigration in the EU member states 
using a multidimensional demographic approach. More 
specifically, we seek to measure and compare the net 
fiscal contributions of immigrants and the native-born 
under alternative scenarios, defined mainly by the volume 
of immigration flows, their skills or their integration into 
the host country’s labour market. CEPAM-Mic allows 
for the simulation of scenarios that combine different 
assumptions on the future evolution of the parameters 
that drive population changes. To achieve this objective, 
we have created seven hypothetical scenarios which, when 
compared to the results of the Baseline scenario, will allow 
us to estimate the potential gains of various immigration 
composition flows and immigrant integration policies on 
their net fiscal contribution. 
 
Before describing what differentiates the scenarios, it 
is useful to describe the components of demographic 
change that are common to all scenarios. All scenarios 
share the same demographic assumptions for fertility, 
mortality and internal migration. In all scenarios, age, 
education and country-specific fertility rates are assumed 
to increase slightly so that the total fertility rate (TRF) 
for the EU as a whole rises from 1.6 children per woman 
to 1.8 children, a level reached in 2055-59 (Lutz et al. 
2017). These fertility rates are then modified to account for 
fertility differentials by region of birth using relative risks 
estimated from multivariate models. These relative risks 
are held constant in the projection model. TFR is higher for 
recent immigrants and for immigrants from certain regions 
such as Sub-Saharan countries, Middle East and North 
Africa. The model is dynamic and instantaneously takes 
into account changes in the composition of the population. 
Accordingly, the scenario that assumes a higher (lower) 
immigration rate also translates into a scenario with a 
slightly higher (lower) TFR than the baseline scenario even 
if the fertility parameters are the same in all scenarios. 
Mortality rates by age, sex and education level are also 
taken from (Lutz et al., 2017). In brief, life expectancy is 
assumed to exceed 90 years in most European countries 
40 The country specific out-migration probability by age and sex is derived from the average number of migrants between 2013 and 2016. The 
destination country choice is based on origin-destination matrices derived using updated estimates for the period 2009-2016 of  Raymer et al., 
(2013) Bayesian estimates of intra-EU mobility. International emigration is treated as a vector in the origin-destination matrices and emigrants 
are simply removed from the simulation rather than being assigned a new country of residence.
by 2060. While a long-term convergence is assumed at a 
regional level, differentials in life expectancy between low 
and high educated individuals are kept constant at about 
4 years for females and 6 years for males. 
 
While people moving from one EU country to another 
are definitively international migrants, when we take an 
European perspective, these movements are alike internal 
migrations. Accordingly, the CEPAM-Mic model treats 
migration between EU countries as internal migration, 
while international migration (immigration and emigration) 
corresponds to the movements of people entering or 
leaving the EU. Internal migration and emigration are based 
on country specific rates by age and sex. In all scenarios, 
the assumption is that both the propensity to emigrate and 
the distribution of migrants between destination countries 
reflect the recent patterns.40
 
Immigration is dealt with separately. Since CEPAM-Mic does 
not project the population of source countries, it is not 
possible to use rates (based on the population of origin) 
and therefore the immigration parameters are exogenous 
to the projection model. Specifically, the projected number 
of immigrants by country is an input to the model that 
is specified for each scenario and the characteristics of 
immigrants are randomly assigned among a specified 
distribution. Generally, this distribution is based on the 
observed distribution of recent immigrants by country, but 
it is also possible to specify other distributions by age, sex, 
education, place of birth, religion, and language in each 
country through reweighting. This approach allows for 
great flexibility on assumptions about the future number 
and characteristics of immigrants. 
 
In Box 2 we present the different scenarios, emphasizing 
the four dimensions in which they vary: 1) the level of 
immigration flows, 2) the level of net fiscal contributions, 
3) the degree of integration process based on labour 
participation rates, and 4) the level of education of 
immigrants. 
 
In the scenarios related to integration process as well 
as in the baseline, we assume that the volume and the 
geographic distribution of immigrants are the same 
as those observed between 2013 and 2016. Their 
characteristics (age, sex, education, etc.), however, replicate 
those of recent immigrants in the base population, that is, 
approximately immigrants who landed in 2008 or 2009. As 
such, the immigration level is assumed to be of 2 million 
immigrants per year across Europe. In the low migration 
scenario, the volume of immigration is set to 240,000 per 
year, which corresponds roughly to the immigration rate 
of Japan. Conversely, in the High immigration scenario, 
the volume is doubled to 4 million per year, which 
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represents an immigration rate similar to the Canadian 
one. The Canadian immigration selection scenario also 
assumes the same volume of immigrants as the High 
immigration scenario, but assumes a different distribution 
of immigrants in terms of education. It replicates the 
higher  educational attainment of immigrants aged 25-
44 in Canada and arrived between 2011 and 2016 as 
observed in the Canadian 2016 Census where about 
two third of immigrants are economic migrants selected 
according to their human capital.
 
Scenarios also differ on the assumptions regarding labour 
market participation, unemployment, tax contributions and 
social benefits gaps between immigrants and natives. All 
the scenarios with the exception of the Equal contribution 
and the Perfect integration ones use the parameters 
estimated as described above to assess the net fiscal 
contributions. The Equal contribution and the Perfect 
integration scenarios, instead, assign to migrants the same, 
more favourable, native-born parameters. Similarly, the 
Equal labour intensity and Perfect integration scenarios 
assume that more favourable employment rates of natives 
also apply to immigrants. Comparing the results from the 
Equal labour intensity scenario to the Baseline scenario 
allows measuring the potential gain in terms of net fiscal 
impact that could result from reducing the gap between 
immigrants and natives in terms of labour intensity. 
Similarly, the Equal contribution scenario measures the 
potential gain that could results from reducing the gap 
in the net fiscal contributions. The Perfect integration 
scenario cumulates both types of potential gains, plus 
any interactions or synergy coming from changing the 
parameters of both the labour force and the net fiscal 
contribution modules.
We can summarize the scenarios as follows:
 
0. Baseline: The Baseline scenario assumes no change in 
recent trends in the components of population changes 
as well as in labour force participation and net fiscal 
contributions. The number of immigrants is assumed 
constant at the level of two million per year.
 
1. Level of Immigration
• High immigration: Same assumptions as in the 
baseline scenario, except for a doubling of the 
annual immigration flows (four million per year) 
similarly to the Canadian rate.
• Low immigration: Same assumptions as in the 
baseline scenario, except immigration levels are 
reduced to 240,000 extra-EU immigrants coming 
each year, which corresponds approximately to the 
Japanese rate.
 
2. Level of NFC
• Equal Contribution: Same assumptions as in the 
baseline scenario, except for the parameters of the 
migrants in the net fiscal impact module, which are 
set equal to those of natives.
 
3. Level of integration 
• Equal labour intensity: Same assumptions as in 
the baseline scenario, except for the parameters 
of the migrants in the labour force and employment 
module, which are set to converge to the native’s 
parameters by 2020.
• Perfect integration of immigrants: This scenario 
adds the advantage of the equal contribution and 
equal labour intensity scenarios as it assumes 
that immigrants achieve the same labour force 
participation and employment rates as the natives 
and the same net fiscal contribution. 
 
4. Level of education
• Canadian immigration selection: Same assumptions 
as in the Baseline scenario except for the volume 
of international immigration that is set equal to the 
high immigration scenario and for the educational 
composition of future immigrants, which reflects the 
educational distribution of Canadian immigrants.
Component Baseline
Low 
immigration
High 
immigration
Equal 
contribution
Equal labor 
intensity
Perfect 
economic 
integration
Canadian 
immigration 
selection
Volume of 
immigration
10M/5 years 1.2 M/5 years 20M/5 years 10M/5 years 10M/5 years 10M/5 years 20M/5 years
Educational 
composition 
of future 
immigrants
Same as recent immigrants
Same as 
immigrants in 
Canada
Integration of 
immigration
Average of 
2010-2015
Average of 
2010-2015
Average of 
2010-2015
Average of 
2010-2015
Rates reach those of EU born
Average of 
2010-2015
Labor force 
participation 
trends
Constant entry and exits rates
TABLE 2. SCENARIOS’ ASSUMPTIONS
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Net fiscal 
impact 
(Contributions 
and benefits)
As estimated 
from 
EUROMOD 
2015 
tax-benefit 
system
As estimated 
from 
EUROMOD 
2015 
tax-benefit 
system
As estimated 
from 
EUROMOD 
2015 
tax-benefit 
system
Parameters 
of foreign 
born reach 
those of EU 
born
As estimated 
from 
EUROMOD 
2015 
tax-benefit 
system
Parameters 
of foreign 
born reach 
those of EU 
born
As estimated 
from 
EUROMOD 
2015 
tax-benefit 
system
Fertility Slight increase in the TFR from 1.6 to 1.8
Emigration Constant country-specific emigration rates by age and sex
Mortality Continuous improvements in life expectancy
Educational 
attainment
Past trends continue, constant parameters for social characteristics
EU internal 
migrations
Average of 2013-2016
Language 
and religion 
shift
Baseline rates
BOX 2 The scenarios and their underlying political assumptions and implications (by Rainer Munz)
The scenarios analysed and discussed in this report are defined mainly by:
• the volume of future immigration flows, 
• their degree of migrants’ integration into the host country’s labour market 
• the pathways of admission and resulting skills composition of future migrants, 
• and the degree to which all this translates into fiscal contributions.
Each scenario can be interpreted as the result of a different mix of migration and integration policies – both at the 
Member States and at EU level. The focus of the scenarios is only on migrants arriving or admitted from third countries 
while intra-EU migration and mobility of EU citizens is kept constant in all scenarios. The base years for the scenario 
are 2008-2014, which means that the effects of the refugee crisis of 2015-2017 are not taken into account.
 
The baseline scenario assumes a continuation of the status quo 2008-2014 prior to the refugee crisis of 2015-2017 
both in terms of inflows and in terms of labour market integration gaps. These assumptions set the benchmark.
 
The assumptions of the other scenarios are not intended to represent a plausible future, but rather serve to illustrate 
what could result from policy changes by comparing the results of each of the alternative scenarios with those of 
the baseline scenario. They should be read as „what if“ projections showing the aggregate effects of certain – partly 
extreme – assumptions on socio-economic and fiscal outcomes.
 
Thus:
The “baseline scenario“ describes a continuation of the status quo (2008-2014): (a) in terms of quantity, age and 
skills distribution of 2 million 3rd country nationals admitted to EU MS annually with a dominance of humanitarian 
admission (asylum, humanitarian protection, marriage and family reunion as main pathways) and only about 30% 
of 3rd country nationals admitted as labour migrants; (b) in terms of labour market integration, deficits (employment 
rates of admitted 3rd county nationals – including asylum seekers – lower than those of natives during the first 20 
years after arrival).
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The “low immigration scenario“ assumes that immigration to the EU would have dropped after 2015 to 240,000 
people per year and continue at that level until 2035. That would most likely require changes in Europe’s humanitarian 
law as both the number of asylum seekers and the number of migrants admitted as brides/grooms and dependent 
family members (family reunion) would have to go down significantly. To achieve low immigration at Member State 
level the scenario would imply: (a) a dramatic reduction in long-term residence permits issued by EU Member States 
for period beyond 12 months), (b) strict border controls at external Schengen borders effectively denying a considerable 
number of potential asylum seekers access to EU territory, (c) substantial restrictions to, or a revocation of, the right 
to family reunion.  In this scenario integration policies would not play a major role due to the dwindling numbers of 
newcomers.   
 
The “high immigration scenario“ assumes a doubling of immigration to 4 million admitted 3rd country nationals 
per year starting in 2015 and staying at that level until 2035, but no substantial change in the mix of migrants. 
Humanitarian admission would remain dominant while labour market integration gaps would increase due to unchanged 
integration policies and an increasing number of immigrants from 3rd countries present in EU Member States.  
 
The “equal contribution scenario“ assumes continuing immigration at the level of 2 million admitted 3rd country 
nationals between 2015 and 2035, a continuation of the current situation in which immigrants from 3rd countries have 
lower labour force participation and higher unemployment than natives, but an upward economic mobility increasing 
the fiscal contributions of immigrants from 3rd countries equalling those of natives. The latter would have to be 
achieved through higher wage income reaching the average of natives. The scenario assumes that this would already 
have been achieved in 2015. Basic requirements would have been (a) the removal of barriers that prevent migrants 
from working according to their skill levels and/or (b) massive investments in education, training and reskilling of 
migrants. To assure that migrants arriving during the projection would perform in a better way the scenario would 
also require  (c) a certain change in the mix of migrants (reducing the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers and 
the amount of people admitted as brides/grooms, dependent family members while increasing the number of labour 
migrants), (d) continuing efforts to train arriving migrants. 
 
The “equal labour intensity scenario“ also assumes continuing immigration at the level of 2 million admitted 
3rd country nationals between 2015 and 2035, but higher labour force participation and lower unemployment rates 
equalling those of natives. The scenario equally assumes that this would already have been achieved in 2015. Basic 
requirements would have been (a) the removal of barriers that prevent migrants from working according to their skill 
levels and/or (b) massive investments in education, training and reskilling of migrants. To assure that migrants arriving 
during the projection would perform in a better way the scenario would also require This would either require (a) a 
clear change in the mix of migrants (reducing the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers and the amount of people 
admitted as brides/grooms, dependent family members; while increasing the number of skilled labour migrants). 
 
The “perfect integration scenario“ assumes keeping immigration at the level of 2 million admitted 3rd country nationals 
between 2015 and 2035 and combines the assumptions of the two previous scenarios (equal contribution and equal labour 
intensity): immigrants from non-EU countries and natives having the same labour force participation and unemployment rates and 
making the same fiscal contribution. This would require a similar mix of policy measures as described above (scenarios 4 and 5). 
 
The “Canadian style selection scenario” assumes both a doubling of immigration to 4 million 3rd country nationals 
per year that would have started in 2015 while continuing at this level until 2035 as well as an age and skills mix of 
3rd country nationals admitted after 2015 similar to the one achieved by the Canadian selection. While the labour 
market performance of those who had arrived before 2015 remains unchanged, the described selection introduced in 
2015 would allow for better labour market integration and higher fiscal contribution. This would require a substantial 
deviation from current European migration policies: (a) a selection of newly admitted 3rd country nationals according 
to age, formal education and skills based on a points system uniformly applied by all EU Member States; (b) changes 
in humanitarian law (applied by all EU Member States) allowing for a drastic reduction in the number of spontaneous 
asylum seekers as Canada also selects refugees according to certain criteria (including skills) before admission; (c) 
stricter selection criteria when admitting brides/grooms or dependent family members (applied by all EU Member 
States). (d) At the same time wage levels and employment opportunities in the labour markets of the EU MSs would 
have to converge to the ones offered by traditional immigration countries (Australia Canada and the US) to be able 
competing with them globally for talent and skills. In this scenario all EU Member States and the UK combined would 
have to recruit about 13 times more skilled migrants than Canada does every year.
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The scenarios present a wide range of possible approaches to immigration and integration ranging:
• from very small to very high numbers of admitted regular migrants and asylum seekers; 
• from a continuation of the status quo with a dominance of humanitarian admission (including marriage and family 
migration) to a much higher degree of selection based on age and skills;
• from a continuation of the status quo with persisting integration gaps to massive integration and/or selection efforts 
leading to better labour market and fiscal outcomes. 
 
Many of these scenarios (in particular: the low migration scenario, the perfect integration scenario and the Canadian 
style selection scenario) would require:
• improved labour market access for regular migrants and refugees and significantly more investment in education 
and training (in particular: the equal contribution scenario, the equal labour intensity and the perfect integration 
scenario);  
• considerable changes in European and national migration, asylum and humanitarian law paving the way for 
fundamental reforms of European migration and asylum policies both at EU and Member States level reducing the 
flow of spontaneous asylum seekers arriving on EU territory as well as of family members uniting with EU residents 
(in particular: the low migration scenario, the perfect integration scenario and the Canadian style selection scenario);
• a high degree of coordination between all EU Member States harmonising criteria and policies governing the admission 
of future labour migrants and dependent family members as well as the granting of asylum  (in particular: the low 
migration scenario, the perfect integration scenario and the Canadian style selection scenario);
 
In the absence of a high degree of EU-wide co-ordination of migration and asylum policies the scenarios can be 
interpreted country by country as potential trajectories of individual EU Member States. The required changes in 
migration and asylum law as well as migration, asylum and integration policies (as indicated for each scenario) would 
remain similar.
 
We concede that most scenarios do not directly address the current policy debate:
• In some scenarios (high immigration scenario, Canadian style selection scenario) parts of the European electorates 
would meet a doubling of annual immigration from 3rd countries, probably with opposition. 
• Considerably reducing the right to asylum and to family reunion/marriage migration (low immigration scenario, 
perfect integration scenario, Canadian style selection scenario) would require constitutional changes for which – in 
a majority of EU Member States – there is most likely not enough political support.
• A situation in which immigrants from 3rd countries continue to have lower labour force participation than natives, 
but an upward economic mobility  increasing their fiscal contributions matching those of natives and EU-born 
migrants (equal contribution scenario) is not easy to imagine.
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5. POPULATION-BASED 
PROJECTION 2015-
2035
5.1.1 BASELINE SCENARIO
We find large variations both in annual net fiscal 
contribution between countries and in differences between 
natives and migrants in a given country. These differences 
are illustrated in Figure 6 for the first period 2015-2019. 
In this figure, countries are ranked by the size of the gap 
between annual net fiscal contributions of natives versus 
extra-EU migrants. For the EU as a whole, the annual 
net fiscal contributions are positive across all population 
groups: 407 euros per capita for natives, 47 euros for 
extra-EU migrants and 3,118 euros for intra-EU migrants. 
However, natives show negative values in 10 countries and 
the extra-EU migrants in 16 out of the 26 EU countries. 
Thus, a majority of countries presents positive annual net 
contributions for natives and a majority of them present 
negative annual net contributions for extra-EU migrants. 
There is, however, a small number of countries like Cyprus, 
Czechia, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Malta, Greece and Spain 
where non-EU migrants show better results compared 
to natives. 
On average for the EU as a whole, the gap between annual 
net fiscal contributions of natives and extra-EU migrants 
is small (360 euros) in favour of natives. This is in part 
due the more favourable age structure of immigrants. In 
some countries, however, the gap between natives and 
immigrants can be much larger than the EU average. Extra-
EU immigrants’ negative impacts exceed 1,000 euros per 
capita in 14 countries, a level reached only by the natives 
of Cyprus. Two countries present gaps larger than 5,000 
FIGURE 5. AVERAGE ANNUAL NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND AGE 15 PER CAPITA BY IMMIGRANT STATUS, EU MEMBER STATES, 2015-2019 
NOTE: COUNTRIES ARE RANKED FROM THE LOWEST TO THE HIGHEST GAP BETWEEN NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIVES AND MIGRANTS.
A) NATIVE AND EXTRA-EU MIGRANTS
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euros per capita between the annual net contributions of 
natives and extra-EU migrants Belgium (7,335 euros per 
capita) and Denmark (6,586 euros per capita). 
 
In most countries, the annual net fiscal contributions (per 
capita) of EU migrants exceed that of natives and the 
annual net fiscal contributions of natives exceeds that 
of extra-EU immigrants (Table A1). Intra-EU migrants, on 
the other hand, present the most favourable annual net 
fiscal impact and show negative net contributions in only 
in two countries (Slovakia and Bulgaria).
5.1.2 PROJECTED TRENDS IN NET 
FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS
Figure 7 contrasts the annual net fiscal contributions 
projected over the period 2015 to 2035 by place of birth 
under the baseline scenario’s assumptions. Since we 
assume constant net fiscal contributions, the evolution 
over time projected here results only from the changes 
in the demographic composition of the population 
groups. The most important of these trends is certainly 
population ageing which would have considerable impact 
on the future financial situation of the ageing countries. 
Population ageing is more salient for natives than for 
immigrants since, by definition, native population is 
not rejuvenated by the arrival of younger than average 
immigrants. This certainly explains the negative slope in 
the native curve. On the opposite, the curve for extra-EU 
migrants is much flatter and consequently, the projection 
shows that the current slightly higher net contributions 
of natives compared to non-EU migrants would reverse 
under the baseline scenario assumptions as early as by 
2020. In 2035, although both NFC would be negative, 
the average annual net fiscal contribution of extra-EU 
immigrants would exceed the contributions of natives by 
about 1,570 euros per capita. Finally, intra-EU migrants 
present the largest annual net fiscal contributions (in their 
country of residence) of the three population groups and 
their fiscal contribution is bound to increase over time. 
This is certainly due to the favourable age and education 
composition of intra-EU migrants.
5.1.3 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
Table 3 contrasts the impact on the average annual net 
fiscal contribution per capita of the total population over 
the projection period for the EU as a whole for the seven 
alternative scenarios described above. Compared to the 
baseline scenario, all scenarios, with the exception of the 
high immigration scenario, generate figures that are more 
favourable.  Changing the levels of extra-EU migrants 
entering each year, however, does not change much the 
future trend of the annual net fiscal contribution per capita. 
Compared to the baseline situation, increasing immigration 
levels to the EU at the Canadian level or decreasing it to 
the Japanese level, only changes the net fiscal contribution 
per capita by about 50 to 60 euros per capita. This is, 
however, a negligible difference when compared to 
the expected decline of about 1,800 euros per capita 
between 2015 and 2035 that results from changes in the 
demographic characteristics of the population, according 
to our baseline scenario. The finding that increasing or 
decreasing immigration flows to the EU doesn’t change 
much the projected annual net fiscal contribution per capita 
of the total population can be explained by the fact that 
the future number of immigrants represent only a small 
B) NATIVE AND INTRA-EU MIGRANTS
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share of the projected total European population.
Increasing immigration while maintaining the same level 
of economic integration for future extra-EU immigrants 
could have an adverse impact on the annual net fiscal 
contribution per capita of European countries, while the 
opposite is true for the low immigration scenario. The 
negative impact of high immigration can be attributed 
to the lower level of education of extra-EU immigrants 
compared to the natives. Indeed, as shown in the Canadian 
immigration scenario, a higher immigration scenario 
associated with a selection based on education, can have 
a slight positive impact. Even more, this impact is similar 
to the one observed in the low immigration scenario 
which assumes decreasing the number of immigrants 
to a level comparable to the Japanese immigration rate. 
In any cases, merely increasing or decreasing the future 
number of immigrants to the EU doesn’t change much 
the projected annual net fiscal contribution per capita of 
the total population because even in the high immigration 
scenario the number of future immigrants represents only 
a small share of the projected total European population. 
However, a fairly large number of immigrants are already 
residing in EU countries. Therefore, assuming a better 
economic integration for them and the future comers can 
create a much larger impact. Assuming that immigrants 
have the same labour intensity as natives would generate 
an increase in net fiscal contributions of 188 euros per 
capita in 2035. Similarly, assuming that their fiscal 
contributions are the same as natives would generate 
an increase of 393 euros per capita. Combining both the 
favourable assumptions about labour intensity and fiscal 
contributions in the perfect integration scenario would 
generate up to 569 euros in gains in the per capita net 
fiscal contributions of immigrants and thus reduce by 
almost half the negative level of this indicator projected 
in the baseline scenario. 
FIGURE 6. PROJECTED NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND AGE 15 BY IMMIGRANT STATUS, EU BASELINE SCENARIO, 2015-2035. 
SOURCE: OWN ELABORATION WITH CEPAM-MIC ON EU SILC-DATA
 Baseline
Low 
immigration
High 
immigration
Equal 
contribution
Equal labour 
intensity
Perfect 
integration
Canadian 
immigration 
selection
2015 516 516 516 516 516 516 516
2020 187 243 108 496 339 638 145
2025 -302 -245 -363 45 -130 207 -283
2030 -821 -756 -888 -443 -643 -275 -764
2035 -1291 -1234 -1347 -898 -1104 -722 -1181
TABLE 3. PROJECTED ANNUAL NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS (15+) PER CAPITA ACCORDING TO SEVEN SCENARIOS, EU MEMBER STATES, 2015-2035
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Figure 8 displays the differences between the per-capita 
net fiscal contribution of extra-EU immigrants in the 
seven scenarios considered compared to the baseline. 
Only in the low immigration scenario extra-EU immigrants 
would contribute less than in our baseline. In the Perfect 
Integration scenario the per capita NFI of the average 
extra-EU immigrants would be 3,500 euros higher than 
our baseline. 
5.1.4 COUNTRY COMPARISON IN 2035
As stated above, there are large variations in terms of 
annual net fiscal contribution between countries and in 
terms of differences between natives and migrants in 
each given country. The analysis presented above for the 
EU as a whole may well differ from country to country. 
Figure 9 presents the projected gains from extra-EU 
migrants in net fiscal contribution per capita in 2035 
generated by each alternative scenario compared to the 
baseline scenario of extra-EU migrants by country. The 
numbers can be interpreted as the additional gain or loss that 
different policies can have in different countries compared 
to current policies. In this figure, countries are ranked from 
lowest (left) to highest (right) according to the net fiscal 
contributions of extra-EU migrants in the baseline scenario. 
The first striking result is that for all countries, the gains 
or losses in terms of NFI of extra-EU immigrants related 
to increased or decreased immigration levels produce 
very little effect compared to the other scenarios. This 
is not surprising given that these two scenarios assume 
that nothing else is changing. Under these circumstances, 
increasing or decreasing immigration would only change 
the characteristics of the immigrants in terms of age 
structure or duration of stay in the country of residence, 
with only minor effect compared to the other drivers of 
economic integration. For all but seven countries, the 
scenario assuming perfect integration of immigrants 
produces the largest gain in NFI of extra-EU migrants 
compared to the Baseline scenario. The seven countries 
where it is not the case, are Portugal, Hungary, Greece, 
Cyprus, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechia. For these countries, 
the Canadian scenario (better educational composition of 
future immigrants) produces instead the largest gains. 
This means that for these countries, what would make a 
real difference is the education level of the immigrants. 
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Finland stand out for 
the size of the potential gains in NFI that their extra-EU 
migrants could make under scenarios proposing better 
integration of immigrants. The Netherlands, France, Austria, 
Germany, Italy and Ireland follow them.
FIGURE 7. PROJECTED GAINS IN NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS (15+) PER CAPITA OF EXTRA-EU MIGRANTS (COMPARED TO BASELINE SCENARIO) 
ACCORDING TO SEVEN SCENARIOS, EU MEMBER STATES, 2015-2035. 
SOURCE: OWN ELABORATION WITH CEPAM-MIC ON EU SILC-DATA
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5.2 LIFE COURSE PERSPECTIVE ON 
NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY 
IMMIGRANT STATUS
5.2.1 POPULATION-BASED AND 
COHORT BASED ESTIMATES
We use CEPAM-Mic to project net fiscal contributions of 
individuals beyond the age of 15 taking both a population 
and a cohort perspective. In the previous section, the 
results were based on the population perspective. Here 
we propose an analysis taking the cohort perspective. The 
main distinction between the population-based and the 
cohort-based projections is that the first one is affected by 
the age structure of the population while the second is not. 
In the population-based projections, a sample of individuals 
observed in 2015 is projected over a period of 20 years 
and a snapshot of the average net fiscal contributions 
of different population groups is taken every 5 years. 
Population-based projection gives a cross-sectional view 
of the net fiscal contributions, which is mainly determined 
by the distribution of the population characteristics at 
the start of the projection period, notably in terms of age 
structure. On the other hand, the cohort-based projection 
compares the cumulated net fiscal contributions of 
population groups over their life course. To achieve that, 
a cohort of births born in 2015 and a cohort of immigrants 
landed in 2015 are projected for their entire lifetime and 
their net contributions are cumulated and averaged over 
the full life cycle. 
 
In a sense, the population-based estimate is alike the crude 
death rate, which doesn’t control for the age structure of 
the population, and the cohort-based estimate is alike 
the life expectancy. A population with a very young age 
structure can show a relatively low crude death rate even 
if its life expectancy is low. To illustrate this, compares 
Nigeria, which is a very young population, and Italy, which is 
much older. Nigeria crude death rate is 11.6 per thousand 
just a bit higher than that of Italy (10.6 per thousand). 
Yet, Nigerians have a much lower life expectancy at 
birth (53.9 years) compared to Italians (83.2 years). To 
assure an adequate funding of many social programs, 
taking into account the age structure of the population is 
important. The benefits paid by funded pension programs, 
for example, depend on the total contributions made by 
participants during their working lives. When the population 
is young, the number of contributors is large relative to 
the number of beneficiaries, and contributions may be 
sufficient to pay for the benefits of few beneficiaries, even 
if the contribution rate is too low to sustain the program 
over the long term. To ensure that the aging population 
will be able to enjoy the same benefits, it is necessary 
to ensure that the contribution rate is sufficient not only 
to pay the annual contributions for the current year, but 
also to capitalize the fund for the future. 
FIGURE 8. PROJECTED GAINS IN ANNUAL NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS (PER CAPITA) OF EXTRA-EU MIGRANTS IN 2035 COMPARED TO THE 
BASELINE SCENARIO ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SCENARIOS BY COUNTRY. 
NOTE: COUNTRIES ARE RANKED FROM THE LOWEST TO THE HIGHEST NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF EXTRA-EU MIGRANTS IN THE BASELINE 
SCENARIO.
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Figure 10 contrasts the cohort-based and the population-
based estimates of net fiscal contributions per capita 
by population groups. When the net fiscal contributions 
are cumulated over the life course, the picture changes 
drastically because the difference in age structure between 
the native and immigrant populations doesn’t play its 
role anymore. The estimated net fiscal contribution of 
natives for the period 2015-2020 in the population-
based projection is slightly positive but turns negative in 
the cohort-based estimate. However, the drop of about 
1,600 euros per capita between the two indicators is much 
smaller than what is projected for the two immigrant 
groups. Although the net fiscal contribution of intra-EU 
migrants remains positive in the cohort-based model (344 
euros per capita), it is shrunken drastically when compared 
to the estimate from the population-based model (3,118 
euros per capita), a decline of 2,775 euros. 
 
For the extra-EU migrants, the differences between 
population-based and cohort-based estimates are even 
larger than for the two other population groups. In the 
population-based model, their net fiscal contribution is 
slightly positive (47 euros per capita), but close to null. 
Under the cohort-based perspective, their net fiscal 
impact drops by 4,353 euros per capita. In a few words, 
a cohort of natives born in 2015 and a cohort of extra-
EU migrants landed on the same year are, over their 
life course and under the assumptions of the baseline 
scenario, both net beneficiaries of fiscal transfers, but 
these fiscal transfers are 2.7 times larger for extra-
EU migrants than for natives over their life course. 
Figure 11 presents the cohort-based estimates of the net 
fiscal impact by country and immigrant status under the 
baseline scenario. Net fiscal contributions are negative 
for almost all countries both for natives and extra-EU 
migrants. Only three countries show positive values for 
natives: Italy, Denmark and Latvia. The same number of 
countries have positive values for extra-EU migrants: 
Czechia, Bulgaria and Latvia. However, in 18 out of 26 
countries, net fiscal contributions of natives, although 
negative, are larger than net fiscal contributions of extra-
EU migrants. On average, net fiscal contributions of natives 
of these countries are 2,782 euros per capita larger than 
the comparable value for extra-EU migrants. The largest 
gaps between natives and extra-EU migrant’s net fiscal 
contributions per capita are generally found in the countries 
that formed the former EU15 like Denmark (-7,470 euros 
per capita), Italy (-5,547 euros per capita) and Sweden 
(-5,324 euros per capita). Only 8 countries (Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Cyprus, Czechia, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary) 
are presenting more favourable net fiscal contributions 
over the life course for extra-EU migrants compared to 
natives, but on average, the gap with natives is smaller 
among these countries (885 euros per capita) than what 
is observed in the former group of countries. Note that for 
eastern European countries these results should be taken 
with care given the very low number of extra-EU migrants. 
 
Under the life course perspective, increasing or decreasing 
the number of immigrants does not change their net fiscal 
contribution per capita. Therefore the analysis of the 
different scenarios are limited here to only the scenarios 
FIGURE 9. COMPARISON OF POPULATION-BASED AND COHORT-BASED ESTIMATES OF PROJECTED GAINS IN ANNUAL NET FISCAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS (PER CAPITA) BY PLACE OF BIRTH.
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assuming different trends in labour force integration or 
immigrant selection. Figure 12 displays the estimate of 
life course net fiscal benefits of extra-EU migrants under 
these five scenarios. Interestingly, for a few countries, 
none of the alternative scenarios produces larger net 
fiscal contributions per capita compared to the baseline 
scenario. These countries are: Bulgaria, Czechia, Spain, 
Greece, Malta, Poland and Portugal.  Denmark stands out 
for the large positive net fiscal impact under scenarios 
assuming perfect integration or better selection of extra-
EU migrants in terms of education. In Cyprus and Ireland, 
the equal labour intensity produces the largest net fiscal 
impact of all scenarios. In Belgium, Germany, France, 
Nederland, Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania 
the perfect integration scenario (equalizing labour force 
intensity and fiscal contributions of extra-EU migrants 
to natives) would generate the largest gain in net fiscal 
contributions of migrants. Finally, the scenario assuming 
a better selection of immigrants in terms of education 
level would be the most favourable to Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia.
FIGURE 10. COHORT-BASED ESTIMATES OF THE NET FISCAL IMPACT BY COUNTRY AND IMMIGRANT STATUS, BASELINE SCENARIO. 
NOTE: COUNTRIES ARE RANKED FROM THE LOWEST TO THE HIGHEST NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIVES AMONG THE EU15 AND NMS13 
GROUPS.
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FIGURE 11. COHORT-BASED NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS PER CAPITA OF EXTRA-EU MIGRANTS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SCENARIOS BY 
COUNTRY.
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6. DISCUSSION
6.1 SUMMARY
Our results underscore the crucial role played by 
demography for the sustainability of the European welfare 
states.  They show that the average immigrant has net 
contributions either in line with those of natives for extra 
EU migrants, or higher than natives for intra-EU migrants. 
To understand this result, it is important to bear in mind the 
evolution of net contributions through the life cycle that 
we describe in Section 3.4. In that section, we illustrate a 
clear pattern: contribution are negative until age 30, they 
raise during working life, peak in the early to mid-fifties 
and drop sharply after that when pension costs and health 
care costs kick in. This general pattern holds irrespective 
of origin, but natives tend to contribute more in the active 
stages of their life and receive more in the later stages. 
The consensus among demographers is that the severe 
ageing process that European native populations have 
gone through is not halting, if anything it might intensify. 
The increase in the average age implies that more natives 
and migrants alike would be among the net recipients of 
fiscal transfers, but the native population is aging faster. 
As a result, this report shows that, in the near future, the 
net contribution of the average extra-EU migrant could 
surpass that of the average native. Yet, in our projections, 
both groups would be, on average, net recipients of fiscal 
transfers for the next two decades while the average 
intra-EU migrant would be a clear net contributor. The 
large net contribution of intra-EU migrants is explained 
by their age structure that is similar to that of extra-EU 
migrants, and by their labour market performance, that 
resembles that of natives.
 
These results are influenced by the different demographic 
composition of each group. The average native would 
receive more transfers than the average extra-EU migrant 
due to the higher age, but this does not tell us what 
the expected fiscal contribution of natives and migrants 
through the life cycle is. In other words, how much should 
we expect a migrant arriving in 2015 to contribute to 
the fiscal balance of the host country from that moment 
until old age? And how much should we expect a native 
entering adulthood in the same year to contribute? Our 
demographic microsimulation model can provide an answer 
to this question by simulating the life course of each EU 
resident. Our evidence is that, again, only the average 
intra-EU migrant would be a net contributor through the 
life cycle. Both natives and extra-EU migrants would be 
net beneficiaries and the benefit would be much larger for 
extra-EU migrants than natives. In particular, in countries 
with generous welfare states such as the Nordic countries, 
France and Belgium, extra-EU migrants would receive on 
average 5,000 euros more than they contribute to the 
public purse per capita and per year. The drain will be 
lower in eastern and southern Member States, but on 
average, across the Union, it will be just shy of 5,000 while 
the native drain would be around 1,000 euros per capita.
 
Our baseline projections are predicated on the central 
assumption that welfare policies, migrants’ selection and 
migrants’ integration in the European labour markets will 
retrace those of recent years. We explore how changes in 
one of these three factors would change our projections in 
seven different scenarios. Under the necessary assumptions, 
our scenarios can offer some guidance to policy makers 
who wish to maximise the fiscal payoffs of migration. This 
exercise clarifies that promoting the integration of extra-EU 
migrants in the European labour markets could pay large 
dividends, while policies that address only the sizes of the 
flows are unlikely to affect the fiscal impacts of migration. 
 
It is important to stress though that given the expected 
flows of migrants in the near future, the impact of migration 
on the overall sustainability of the European welfare states 
would be limited. Under any realistic migration scenario, 
natives will make up the vast majority of the resident 
population in the EU. This group will pay most of the 
taxes and receive the majority of benefits. Therefore, the 
sustainability of the European welfare states depends 
mostly on them.  
6.2 BIAS AND SENSITIVITY
This report set an ambitious goal: projecting the fiscal 
impact of migration to the European Union for the next 
two decades. To render this goal achievable it had to rely 
on several assumptions and simplifications that we discuss 
here and should be kept in mind when reading our results. 
Some of the possible biases concern the imputation of the 
net fiscal benefits, other are related to the demographic 
projections.  
6.2.1 LIMITATIONS OF NFI 
IMPUTATIONS
While many monetary benefits received by the individual 
are directly observable in our micro data, in-kind benefits 
are not. In-kind benefits account for a large share of public 
expenditures. Ignoring these benefits altogether would 
have rendered our imputations severely incomplete. For 
this reason, we have decided to resort to additional data 
sources even when these sources contained only partial 
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information. In particular, data on health expenditures 
are only available by age group without distinction by 
origin. We assign in-kind health benefits based on age. 
Consequently, we are assuming that migrants and natives 
of the same age will benefit from public health care in the 
same manner. There is ample evidence that this might not 
be the case as migrants tend to underuse this type of public 
services. Our imputation for this item will overestimate 
public expenditure on migrants. Nevertheless, in-kind 
benefits on health, education and social housing account 
for about two third of total expenditures. Additionally, 
we do not consider expenditures for public goods and 
services related to child care and elderly care although 
in some EU countries they account for a large share of 
total expenditures. Ignoring these items will lead us to 
overstate the benefits received by migrant as there are 
evidences that they tend to use less public care services 
than natives.41 Other public good expenditure such as those 
related to public transportation are not considered, but they 
are likely to be equally provided to migrants and natives.
A second important issue is the imputation of indirect 
taxes. We impute taxes based on HBS data accounting 
for differences in savings and consumption rates between 
natives and migrants. However, in countries where 
information of country of birth is missing, - Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia - saving rates and 
consumption patterns are assumed to be equal between 
natives and migrants as long as the disposable income 
and household structure is the same. This is unlikely to 
be true in practice. There are indications that migrants 
save more and it is reasonable to assume that they will 
spend at least a share of their disposable income in their 
country of origin and send part of their income to their 
original country. If this is the case, we are overestimating 
the VAT payed by migrants in the destination country. 
6.2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS
In the demographic projections, we are assuming that 
migrants have the same emigration rate by age, sex 
and education level than the natives because no data on 
emigration differential by place of birth are available. This 
assumption is not neutral for our results as majority of 
the benefits, either related to pension entitlements, or to 
in-kind benefits, are received after retirement. Evidence on 
return migration (Dustmann and Görlach, 2016) suggests 
that more than half of migrants to Europe will leave the 
host country within 10 years. 
41 For example, Boll and Lagemann (2018) find an underrepresentation in day-care centres of children under age of 3 years whose both 
parents have a migrant background. Figari and Narazani (2020) estimate that foreign women use less childcare services when compared to 
natives in Italy.
By assuming that emigration rates are the same for all 
population groups, we underestimate return migration 
and we are probably overstating the public expenditures 
targeted to migrants, as most of them will spend the later 
year of their lives in their country of origin. Furthermore, 
our simulations assume full portability of pension rights, 
which might not be possible in some pension systems or 
for some migrants with irregular carriers or short stay in 
the hosting country. On the other hand, this assumption 
will lead us to overstate also the taxes paid by migrants 
to the host country both in terms of direct and indirect 
taxation. The net effect is probably an underestimation 
of the net fiscal contribution of the average migrant as 
pension rights bear heavily on the fiscal burden of the 
older population, but this is hard to assess with the data 
at hand.  
 
The report simulates several policy changes, but it is silent 
on the costs that would be required by such changes. The 
gains presented here are then to be interpreted not as 
net gains. Accounting for the costs of integration policies 
would probably depress the net fiscal position of extra-EU 
immigrants under the analysed scenarios, but we do not 
believe that the inclusion of these costs would change the 
indications of our simulations substantially.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1. EUROMOD TAX AND 
BENEFIT AGGREGATION
EUROMOD uses several income list concepts to harmonize 
the model across all European countries. For detailed 
information, see also the EUROMOD modelling conventions.
For social security contributions, EUROMOD aggregates:
• Employer social insurance contributions (ils_sicer) – 
including (employer) payroll taxes.
• Credited social insurance contributions (ils_sicct) – 
contributions paid by government or social security 
institution on benefits (if these are simulated)
• Employee social insurance contributions (ils_sicee)
• Self-employed social insurance contributions (ils_sicse)
• Other social insurance contributions (ils_sicot) – 
contributions paid by individuals but not directly linked to 
employment or self-employment (e.g. SIC due on benefits 
and paid by the benefit recipients, health contributions 
paid by general population)
 
Benefits aggregation follows the Eurostat definitions 
(ESSPROS & SILC):
• Child-birth related benefits (ils_b1_bcb) – benefits 
related to the cost of pregnancy, childbirth and adoption.
• Family benefits (ils_b1_bfa) – benefits related to the cost 
of pregnancy, childbirth and adoption (i.e. ils_b1_bcb), 
bringing up children and caring for other family members 
(classification corresponding to SILC variable HY050G);
• Education benefits (ils_b1_bed) - grants, scholarships and 
other education help received by students (classification 
corresponding to SILC variable PY140G); 
• Old-age benefits (ils_b1_boa) – income maintenance 
and support in connection with old age (classification 
corresponding to SILC variable PY100G);
• Survivor benefits (ils_b1_bsu) – income maintenance 
and support in connection with the death of a family 
member (classification corresponding to SILC variable 
PY110G);
• Disability benefits (ils_b1_bdi) – income maintenance 
and support (except health care) in connection with the 
inability of physically or mentally disabled people to 
engage in economic and social activities (classification 
corresponding to SILC variable PY130G);
• Unemployment benefits (ils_b1_bun) – income 
maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection 
with unemployment (classification corresponding to SILC 
variable PY090G);
• Health/sickness benefits (ils_b1_bhl) – income 
maintenance and support in connection with physical or 
mental illness, excluding disability; health care intended 
to maintain, restore or improve the health of the people 
protected irrespective of the origin of the disorder 
(classification corresponding to SILC variable PY120G);
• Housing benefits (ils_b1_bho) – help towards the cost 
of housing (classification corresponding to SILC variable 
HY070G);
• Social assistance/exclusion benefits (ils_b1_bsa) – 
benefits (except health care) specifically intended to 
combat social exclusion where they are not covered by 
one of the other functions (classification corresponding 
to SILC variable HY060G).
Regarding taxes, we can distinguish in EUROMOD between 
several income taxes:
• General income tax
• Tax on investment income, capital income tax
• Property tax
• Other taxes (such as health, municipal, pension insurance, 
wealth or early retirement tax)
Figure 4 visualizes the aggregation rules used in EUROMOD. 
As already mentioned, we aggregate the benefits to three 
categories: Unemployment benefits (ils_b1_bun), Pension 
benefits (ils_b1_boa and ils_b1_bsu) and the rest of the 
benefits.
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FIGURE 12. CSTRUCTURE OF STANDARD INCOME LISTS. 
SOURCE: EUROMOD (2018)
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FIGURE 13. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - AUSTRIA.
ANNEX 2. COUNTRY FICHES
AUSTRIA
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FIGURE 14. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - AUSTRIA.
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FIGURE 15. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - BELGIUM.
BELGIUM
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FIGURE 16. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - BELGIUM.
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FIGURE 17. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - FINLAND.
FINLAND
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FIGURE 18. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - FINLAND.
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FIGURE 19. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - FRANCE.
FRANCE
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FIGURE 20. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - FRANCE.
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FIGURE 21. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - SWEDEN.
SWEDEN
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FIGURE 22. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - SWEDEN.
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FIGURE 23. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - GERMANY.
GERMANY
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FIGURE 24. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - GERMANY.
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FIGURE 25. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - IRELAND.
IRELAND
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FIGURE 26. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - IRELAND.
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU70
FIGURE 27. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - ITALY.
ITALY
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FIGURE 28. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - ITALY.
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FIGURE 29. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - NETHERLANDS.
NETHERLANDS
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FIGURE 30. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - NETHERLANDS.
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FIGURE 31. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - CYPRUS.
CYPRUS
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FIGURE 32. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - CYPRUS.
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU76
FIGURE 33. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - SPAIN.
SPAIN
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FIGURE 34. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - SPAIN.
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FIGURE 35. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - SLOVENIA.
SLOVENIA
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FIGURE 36. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - SLOVENIA.
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FIGURE 37. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - CZECHIA.
CZECHIA
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FIGURE 38. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - CZECHIA.
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FIGURE 39. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - ESTONIA.
ESTONIA
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FIGURE 40. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - ESTONIA.
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FIGURE 41. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - GREECE.
GREECE
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU 85
FIGURE 42. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - GREECE.
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FIGURE 43. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - HUNGARY.
HUNGARY
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FIGURE 44. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - HUNGARY.
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FIGURE 45. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - LITHUANIA.
LITHUANIA
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FIGURE 46. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - LITHUANIA.
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FIGURE 47. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - POLAND.
POLAND
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FIGURE 48. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - POLAND.
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FIGURE 49. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - PORTUGAL.
PORTUGAL
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FIGURE 50. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - PORTUGAL.
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FIGURE 51. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - SLOVAKIA.
SLOVAKIA
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FIGURE 52. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - SLOVAKIA.
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FIGURE 53. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - PORTUGAL.
BULGARIA
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FIGURE 54. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - BULGARIA.
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU98
FIGURE 55. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - CROATIA.
CROATIA
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FIGURE 56. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - CROATIA.
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FIGURE 57. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - ROMANIA.
ROMANIA
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FIGURE 58. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - ROMANIA.
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FIGURE 59. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - MALTA.
MALTA
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FIGURE 60. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - MALTA.
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FIGURE 61. DECOMPOSITION OF NET FISCAL IMPACT - LATVIA.
LATVIA
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FIGURE 62. MODEL PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION - LATVIA.
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ANNEX 3. VAT RATES IN THE EU 2015
VAT rate In %
Belgium Standard 21
Reduced 6/12
Bulgaria Standard 20
Reduced 9
Czech Republic Standard 21
Reduced 10/15
Denmark Standard 25
Reduced -
Germany Standard 19
Reduced 7
Estonia Standard 20
Reduced 9
Ireland Standard 23
Reduced 9/13.5 (4.8)
Greece Standard 23
Reduced 6.5/13
Spain Standard 21
Reduced 10 (4)
France Standard 20.0
Reduced 5.5/10 (2.1)
Croatia Standard 25
Reduced 5/13
Italy Standard 22
Reduced 10 (4)
Cyprus Standard 19
Reduced 5/9
Latvia Standard 21
Reduced 12
Lithuania Standard 21
Reduced 5/9
Luxembourg Standard 17
Reduced 8/14 (3)
Hungary Standard 27
Reduced 5/18
Malta Standard 18
Reduced 5/7
Netherlands Standard 21
Reduced 6
Austria Standard 20
Reduced 10
SOURCE: EC (2019). NOTES: RATES GIVEN IN THE TABLE ARE RATES APPLICABLE (FOR MORE THAN 6 MONTH IN THE YEAR CONSIDERED, OR) ON 
THE 1ST JULY OF THAT YEAR. WHEN CHANGE OF RATES OCCURRED DURING THE YEAR (NOT ON 1ST JANUARY) THE EXACT DATE IS AVAILABLE IN 
THE NOTES. SUPER-REDUCED RATES (BELOW 5%) ARE SHOWN IN BRACKETS. NOTE THAT ‘PARKING RATES’ ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE, AS 
THEY ARE “HISTORIC RATES” BELOW 15% NEGOTIATED BY MEMBER STATES, AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE EU DIRECTIVE (ONLY 5 MEMBER STATES 
RETAIN THEM).
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Poland Standard 23
Reduced 5/8
Portugal Standard 23
Reduced 6/13
Romania Standard 24
Reduced 5/9
Slovenia Standard 22
Reduced 9.5
Slovakia Standard 20
Reduced 10
Finland Standard 24
Reduced 10/14
Sweden Standard 25
Reduced 6/12
United Kingdom Standard 20
Reduced 5
Simple averages
EU-28 Standard 21.6
EA-19 Standard 20.8
PROJECTING THE NET FISCAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EU108
ANNEX 4. IN-KIND BENEFITS
TABLE 4. IN-KIND BENEFITS FOR HEALTH IN EURO (YEARLY PER PERSON)
age group AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL
0 to 5 1262 1190 132 254 489 1008 1732 320 298
5 to 10 1001 944 105 201 388 800 1374 254 236
10 to 15 1407 1327 148 283 545 1124 1932 356 332
15 to 20 1492 1406 156 300 578 1192 2048 378 352
20 to 25 1650 1556 173 332 639 1318 2265 418 390
25 to 30 1861 1755 195 375 721 1487 2555 471 440
30 to 35 1927 1817 202 388 747 1539 2645 488 455
35 to 40 1905 1796 200 383 738 1521 2614 482 450
40 to 45 1970 1858 207 397 763 1574 2705 499 465
45 to 50 2250 2122 236 453 872 1798 3089 570 531
50 to 55 2583 2435 271 520 1001 2063 3545 654 610
55 t0 60 2962 2793 311 596 1148 2366 4066 750 700
60 to65 3303 3114 346 665 1280 2639 4534 837 780
65 to 70 4191 3951 439 843 1623 3348 5752 1062 990
70 to 75 5209 4911 546 1049 2018 4161 7151 1320 1230
75 to 80 7095 6689 744 1428 2749 5667 9739 1797 1675
80+ 14211 13398 1490 2860 5505 11352 19507 3600 3356
ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU
0 to 5 553 1281 1090 279 219 1389 726 280 2030
5 to 10 438 1016 864 221 174 1101 576 222 1610
10 to 15 616 1428 1215 311 244 1548 810 312 2264
15 to 20 653 1514 1288 330 259 1641 858 331 2400
20 to 25 723 1675 1425 365 286 1816 950 366 2655
25 to 30 815 1889 1607 412 323 2048 1071 413 2994
30 to 35 844 1956 1664 426 334 2120 1109 428 3100
35 to 40 834 1933 1645 421 330 2096 1096 423 3064
40 to 45 863 2000 1702 436 342 2168 1134 437 3170
45 to 50 985 2284 1943 498 390 2476 1295 499 3621
50 to 55 1131 2621 2230 571 448 2842 1486 573 4155
55 t0 60 1297 3007 2558 655 514 3260 1704 657 4766
60 to65 1446 3352 2852 731 573 3634 1900 733 5314
65 to 70 1835 4253 3619 927 726 4611 2411 930 6742
70 to 75 2281 5287 4498 1152 903 5732 2997 1156 8381
75 to 80 3106 7200 6127 1569 1230 7806 4082 1574 11414
80+ 6222 14423 12272 3143 2463 15636 8177 3153 22863
LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK
0 to 5 183 486 1377 221 409 130 1293 492 458
5 to 10 145 385 1092 176 324 103 1026 390 363
10 to 15 204 542 1535 247 456 145 1442 549 511
15 to 20 217 574 1627 262 483 154 1529 581 542
20 to 25 240 635 1800 289 535 170 1691 643 599
25 to 30 270 717 2030 326 603 192 1908 726 676
30 to 35 280 742 2102 338 624 199 1975 751 700
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35 to 40 276 733 2078 334 617 197 1952 742 692
40 to 45 286 759 2149 346 638 203 2020 768 716
45 to 50 327 866 2455 395 729 232 2307 877 817
50 to 55 375 994 2817 453 837 267 2647 1007 938
55 t0 60 430 1140 3231 520 960 306 3036 1155 1076
60 to65 479 1272 3603 579 1070 341 3385 1288 1199
65 to 70 608 1613 4571 735 1358 433 4295 1634 1522
70 to 75 756 2005 5682 914 1688 538 5339 2031 1892
75 to 80 1030 2731 7739 1244 2299 732 7272 2766 2576
80+ 2063 5471 15501 2492 4604 1467 14566 5540 5160
TABLE 5. IN-KIND BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION IN EURO (YEARLY PER ON CURRENT EDUCATION LEVEL)
Education level 1 2 3 4 5 6
AT 6894 8808 11928 11426 11426 13960
BE 6101 7976 9898 10823 10823 13825
BG 1868 1370 1537 1314 1314 1275
CY 2715 6630 8017 8134 8134 7420
CZ 2316 2249 3728 3260 3260 3154
DE 6662 6412 7898 8693 8693 14090
DK 10079 11798 13412 16185 16185 34809
EE 2666 3052 3254 3396 3396 5283
EL 2572 3432 4249 4130 4130 4470
ES 3427 3996 5071 5430 5430 6319
FI 9897 7952 12511 8543 8543 18236
FR 5841 5734 7870 10250 10250 11151
HR 2027 2095 2095 1950 1950 2318
HU 2675 1557 1610 3465 3465 2938
IE 5358 6418 8308 10292 10292 10329
IT 4082 5694 6276 6278 6278 7009
LT 1905 2304 2214 2611 2611 3563
LU 17526 17422 18625 17649 17649 25670
LV 2607 3237 3227 3432 3432 3580
MT 4900 5306 7849 5953 5953 10344
NL 6221 6751 9553 9128 9128 15194
PL 2028 2750 2829 2376 2376 3367
PT 2769 3972 5306 4674 4674 4594
RO 927 681 1233 1153 1153 1965
SE 13267 10390 11221 12449 12449 26975
SI 4433 4985 5570 4349 4349 5621
SK 2355 2792 2880 3088 3088 4942
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TABLE 6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2019 
SOURCE: EUROSTAT
Country
Population of 15-64 (on the 
Total Population)
Population of 65 and over (on 
the Total Population)
Proportion on 
the Immigrant  
Population (aged 
15-64)
Proportion on 
the Immigrant  
Population (aged 65 
over)
 Natives Intra EU Extra 
EU 
Natives Intra EU Extra 
EU
Intra-EU Extra-EU Intra-EU Extra-EU 
Austria 51.01 6.77 8.91 16.25 1.53 1.06
Belgium 50.58 5.64 7.91 16.56 1.51 0.83 45.97 54.03 58.42 41.58
Bulgaria 62.98 0.18 1.12 21.00 0.12 0.21 8.39 91.61 15.36 84.64
Croatia 55.78 1.28 7.88 16.87 0.31 3.36 9.93 90.07 37.42 62.58
Cyprus 49.32 12.12 5.85 14.33 1.14 0.58 40.07 59.93 73.49 26.51
Czechia 60.19 1.66 2.66 19.33 0.15 0.11 22.62 77.38 58.29 41.71
Denmark 53.71 3.52 6.70 18.51 0.43 0.62 50.80 49.20 42.99 57.01
Estonia 55.46 1.42 6.93 13.68 0.27 5.82 39.81 60.19 36.22 63.78
Finland 56.21 1.95 3.90 21.44 0.12 0.26 29.35 70.65 46.82 53.18
France 53.04 1.98 6.90 17.29 1.02 1.80 24.27 75.73 52.62 47.38
Germany 51.84 4.77 8.25 17.71 2.55 1.29 46.19 53.81 52.74 47.26
Greece 53.42 2.86 7.35 20.70 0.28 1.05
Hungary 61.82 2.34 1.96 18.48 0.60 0.25 23.54 76.46 62.31 37.69
Ireland 52.05 9.62 3.63 12.60 1.23 0.27
Italy 54.75 2.66 6.56 22.09 0.25 0.50 15.87 84.13 24.52 75.48
Latvia 57.70 0.59 5.55 14.28 0.51 5.47 9.55 90.45 15.75 84.25
Lithuania 62.19 0.35 2.60 18.34 0.09 1.35 5.93 94.07 20.97 79.03
Luxembourg 30.87 27.92 10.68 8.92 4.76 0.70 60.50 39.50 67.55 32.45
Malta 50.13 8.15 9.37 17.19 1.18 0.31
Netherlands 54.23 3.05 7.70 17.47 0.41 1.30 47.61 52.39 30.98 69.02
Poland 66.20 0.21 0.57 16.84 0.28 0.53 21.12 78.88 62.00 38.00
Portugal 56.52 2.17 5.76 20.88 0.33 0.63 26.70 73.30 56.68 43.32
Romania 64.10 0.22 1.45 18.28 0.08 0.16
Slovakia 66.11 1.64 0.47 15.11 0.84 0.10 66.79 33.21 78.95 21.05
Slovenia 55.30 1.92 7.85 17.50 1.14 1.22
Spain 53.93 3.33 8.58 18.15 0.61 0.64 19.40 80.60 41.99 58.01
Sweden 47.49 3.58 11.23 17.28 1.55 1.07 24.32 75.68 35.12 64.88
United 
Kingdom
52.04 4.41 7.19 16.84 0.56 1.00     
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TABLE 7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2019 
SOURCE: EUROSTAT
Country Activity rate (aged 15-64) Employment rate (aged 
15-64)
Less than primary, primary 
and lower secondary education 
(aged 15-64)
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  (aged 15-64)
Tertiary education  (aged 
15-64)
N
atives
Intra EU
 
m
igrants
Extra-EU
 
m
igrants
N
atives
Intra EU
 
m
igrants
Extra-EU
 
m
igrants
N
atives
Intra EU
 
m
igrants
Extra-EU
 
m
igrants
N
atives
Intra EU
 
m
igrants
Extra-EU
 
m
igrants
N
atives
Intra EU
 
m
igrants
Extra-EU
 
m
igrants
Austria 77.6 79.1 72.0 74.9 74.9 64.5 16.0 13.8 38.8 52.7 46.5 37.7 31.3 39.7 23.5
Belgium 69.9 71.8 60.9 66.9 67.0 52.3 23.4 28.1 41.5 39.6 31.9 31.9 36.9 40.0 26.6
Bulgaria 73.3 : 64.8 70.1 70.1 63.1 21.9 : : 53.5 : 50.6 24.6 : 44.7
Croatia 66.7 72.3 64.0 62.2 62.3 59.9 17.8 7.5 22.6 59.8 63.6 60.0 22.4 28.9 17.4
Cyprus 75.6 78.8 75.9 70.0 70.5 71.0 21.4 19.2 23.8 38.1 42.3 37.4 40.5 38.5 38.7
Czechia 76.5 80.8 82.4 75.0 75.0 80.3 12.2 15.5 15.4 66.6 54.2 52.0 21.1 30.3 32.6
Denmark 80.1 82.7 67.1 76.3 76.3 61.2 25.8 14.9 35.1 41.8 32.5 32.6 32.4 52.6 32.4
Estonia 78.8 75.1 80.0 75.4 75.3 75.2 16.9 14.3 6.0 47.8 32.0 48.3 35.2 53.7 45.8
Finland 78.7 81.6 68.7 73.6 73.7 59.0 15.9 24.2 31.7 44.8 43.4 40.7 39.3 32.4 27.5
France 72.3 74.3 65.9 66.6 66.7 56.2 21.4 32.4 37.5 44.4 34.0 32.2 34.1 33.6 30.3
Germany 80.3 82.6 70.6 78.2 78.3 65.8 15.8 26.5 38.7 57.7 47.9 38.9 26.5 25.5 22.4
Greece 67.9 69.5 75.6 56.8 56.7 53.6 24.6 22.9 42.8 46.4 50.4 44.7 29.0 26.8 12.5
Hungary 72.4 80.3 78.5 69.9 70.1 75.9 20.1 16.7 10.7 57.7 51.0 55.4 22.2 32.3 33.8
Ireland 72.4 78.7 70.8 68.9 69.9 65.7 23.7 14.3 9.4 38.7 41.4 29.1 37.6 44.3 61.5
Italy 64.9 71.6 70.3 58.7 58.8 61.2 38.2 38.1 55.4 43.7 49.5 31.9 18.2 12.4 12.7
Latvia 77.5 66.7 76.8 72.5 72.3 71.5 15.7 16.1 4.7 52.9 58.4 63.6 31.4 25.4 31.7
Lithuania 78.1 73.2 76.6 73.0 73.0 72.6 11.3 17.5 5.7 50.7 50.8 57.9 38.0 31.7 36.3
Luxembourg 65.5 78.9 71.0 62.9 68.6 62.5 29.7 24.3 24.2 42.2 23.1 26.9 28.1 52.6 49.0
Malta 73.4 86.1 84.2 70.9 72.4 80.1 45.0 29.5 34.7 33.3 28.7 24.7 21.7 41.8 40.6
Netherlands 82.7 79.0 67.9 80.2 80.0 63.2 24.6 21.6 34.9 40.7 32.9 34.2 34.7 45.6 30.8
Poland 70.5 75.4 80.4 68.2 68.2 75.8 13.4 : 4.6 58.6 33.4 48.5 28.1 59.9 46.9
Portugal 74.6 85.8 82.6 69.8 70.0 75.3 49.4 29.4 32.1 27.7 36.0 37.8 22.9 34.6 30.1
Romania 68.6 : 75.6 65.8 65.8 72.6 25.1 : : 58.9 : : 16.0 : :
Slovakia 72.6 83.5 78.4 68.3 68.4 73.3 14.6 : : 62.4 62.1 44.0 23.0 32.6 44.0
Slovenia 75.6 74.4 71.8 72.3 72.3 67.5 14.4 12.7 30.3 54.5 57.4 58.5 31.1 29.9 11.2
Spain 73.0 80.1 76.4 63.4 63.7 60.8 39.4 30.8 44.5 23.7 35.9 30.9 36.9 33.3 24.6
Sweden 84.5 82.3 76.5 80.7 80.5 62.3 16.2 18.5 40.0 46.1 30.3 25.8 37.7 51.3 34.2
United Kingdom 78.2 84.8 73.8 75.3 75.8 70.0 19.8 14.0 17.5 41.6 39.2 30.8 38.6 46.7 51.6
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TABLE A1. NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND AGE 15 BY IMMIGRANT STATUS, EU MEMBER STATES, 2015-2019 
NOTE: COUNTRIES ARE RANKED FROM THE LOWEST TO THE HIGHEST GAP BETWEEN NET FISCAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIVES AND EXTRA-EU 
MIGRANTS.
Natives Intra-EU migrants Extra-EU migrants Gap in NFI between 
natives and extra-EU 
migrants
CY -2302 789 1059 -3361
CZ 388 3138 3547 -3160
PT -621 2304 2120 -2742
IT 1173 4798 3276 -2102
IE -940 1718 1047 -1986
MT -635 2507 1228 -1863
GR -857 1119 718 -1575
ES 38 3007 884 -846
FI 1495 9734 1391 104
All 407 3118 47 360
DE 1017 3932 646 371
AT 382 5527 -11 393
HR 9 936 -604 613
NL -486 5231 -1221 735
HU 130 697 -1156 1286
FR -42 423 -1509 1467
BG -284 -855 -2379 2094
SI -416 787 -2511 2095
LV 1090 461 -1042 2132
SE 630 759 -1698 2328
LT 545 862 -1826 2371
SK 158 -1276 -2463 2621
EE 944 1671 -2257 3201
PL 243 1009 -3688 3931
RO -93 3916 -4586 4493
DK 2214 1465 -4372 6586
BE 1023 5096 -6312 7335
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Figure 33. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Spain
Figure 34. Model predictions and validation - Spain
Figure 35. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Slovenia
Figure 36. Model predictions and validation - Slovenia
Figure 37. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Czechia
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Figure 38. Model predictions and validation - Czechia
Figure 39. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Estonia
Figure 40. Model predictions and validation - Estonia
Figure 41. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Greece
Figure 42. Model predictions and validation - Greece
Figure 43. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Hungary
Figure 44. Model predictions and validation - Hungary
Figure 45. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Lithuania
Figure 46. Model predictions and validation - Lithuania
Figure 47. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Poland
Figure 48. Model predictions and validation - Poland
Figure 49. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Portugal
Figure 50. Model predictions and validation - Portugal
Figure 51. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Slovakia
Figure 52. Model predictions and validation - Slovakia
Figure 53. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Bulgaria
Figure 54. Model predictions and validation - Bulgaria
Figure 55. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Croatia
Figure 56. Model predictions and validation - Croatia
Figure 57. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Romania
Figure 58. Model predictions and validation - Romania
Figure 59. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Malta
Figure 60. Model predictions and validation - Malta
Figure 61. Decomposition of net fiscal impact - Latvia
Figure 62. Model predictions and validation - Latvia
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